Recognition Memory for Pictorial Events: Fusion or Features by Leibrich, Julie
RECOGNITION ME}MRY FOR PICTORIAL EVENTS:
FUSION OR FEATURES
A dissertation presented to the l/ictoria
University of blellington in partial
fulfillment of the requirements fsr
degree of Doctor of PhilosoPhy
Julie Leibrich
-11-
CONTENTS
ACKNC['ILEDGEI'ENTS
ABSTRACT
LITERATURE REVIEI,{
Introducti on
Background
Problems of definition
Context and features in perceptual processing
The role of schemata in memorY
The 'pi ctori al superiori ty' effect
Jenkinst studies of fusion
Introduction to the present experiments
EXPERIMENT I
EXPERIMS'IT I I
EXPERIMENT III
EXPERIMENT IV
EXPERIMENT V
EXPERIMENT VI
GENERAL DISCUSSION
AppENDIX A: Summary tables of AN0VAS
REFERENCES
lll
1
3
?
4
5
I
25
48
54
63
69
82
93
100
L26
139
146
r57
L77
vtoToRtA uN \/ERS!TY OF WELUNGTON
-llr-
ACKNOt.lLEDGEMENTS
I wish to thank Dr. K.G. White, my supervisor, for his valued
encouragement and assistance during this research; John Maruick
and Kim Saffron for the strength of their intellectual contribu-
tions during its construction; and Harold Bernhardt for ensuring
its completion.
I am also grateful to many friends for their warmth and support,
particularly during the 'last two years, and to the following
people for their specific skills: Ross Renner and John Whitmore
for their assistance with exploratory analyses and interpretation
of the ranking and rating data in Experiment IV; Linda Searle for
typing the manuscript; Mark Phillips and Helen l,lhite for their
he'lp in preparation of the figures; the actors - Doris Eldridge,
John Eldridge, Susan Genet, Jill Humphreys, Ron Humphreys, Jan
Ivlorri son, Paul l'lorri son; and the subjects .
This research was supported by a University Grants Corrnittee
Postgraduate Scholarship and a Victoria Univers'ity of Wellington
Research Grant (46/77).
-1-
ABSTRACT
This research investigated recognition memory for picture
stories. Jenkins, tltald and Pittenger (1978) had found that when
subjects viewed a slide sequence which depicted an every-day
event, in a later recognition memory test they correctly rejected
distractors which were inconsistent with the event but falsely
accepted consistent distractors. Jenkins interpreted this result
as evidence that fusion - the abstraction of visual events -
determined memory performance. He argued that subjects compared
the test slides to the abstracted event and accepted those which
were consistent with the event. A series of experiments examined
the possibility that performance 565 due not to fusion but to
confusion with respect to the featural details of the stimulus
rnaterial. This alternative interpretation argued that consistent
slides had more features in corrnon with acquisition slides than
did the inconsistent slides and that the variables of semantic
consistency and featural similarity had been confounded. The
first experirent manipulated acquisition material and found that
subjects who saw a disordered acquisition sequence falsely
accepted consistent slides. The second experiment manipulated
acquisition conditions and found that subjects who were inhibited
from fusing the event by being required to perform a non-semantic
task during acquisition falsely accepted 'consistent slides.
Neither of these results supported a fusion interpretation since
acceptance of 'consistent slides occurred under conditions where
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fusion of the event was not expected. The third experiment
manipulated the test conditions and found that acceptance of both
consistent and inconsistent slides was less like'ly with delayed
tests although fusion of the event should have led to no change
in the likelihood of accepting inconsistent slides. The fourth
and fifth experiments re-examined the manipulation of presentation
order and demonstrated that subiects were unable to reconstruct
the event from a disordered sequence and yet still falsely
accepted consistent' slides. Each test of the fusion interpre-
tation which had attempted to separate the variables of features
and meaning indirectly had indicated that recognition pefforrnance
was not due to abstraction of the v|sual event. A final experi-
ment attempted to find explicit evidence for a featural interpre-
tation of the results. by directly varying featural simi'larity of
consistent distractor slides to slides from the original'ly
viewed sequence while keeping the degree of semanttc consistency
constant, A'lthough this experiment failed to support a featural
account, the converging evidence from al1 experiments indicateO
that recognition memory for picture stories is based to a large
extent on the featural properties of the stimu'lus material ' An
account of performance solely in terms of visual abstraction is
not adequate. Moreover, unless the variahles of featural simi'lar-
ity and meaning can be separated directly in the test material n
this recognition paradigm is unl'ikely to provide a means for
examining the influence of schemata on recognition memory for
oicture stories.
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LITEMTURE REVIE}I
Introduction
Jenkins (tSZ+1 described fusion as the abstraction of an
event from a series of related items, In a set of experiments
which examined the nature of visual events, Jenkinsn Wald and
Pittenger (tSZa1 attempted to demonstrate fusion of pictoria'l
action-sequences by showing that "specific memory for individual
pictures (was) outwe'ighed by the abstract or general memory for
the event experienced" (p. 139). Using a recognition memory
paradigm, Jenkins found that subiects who had seen a slide
sequence showing a pictorial event, correctly reiected distractors
which were semantical'ty inconsistent with the event but falsely
accepted consistent di stractors.
The specific thesis of my research is that in Jenkins' exper-
imentS, consistent distractors had more Visual features in corunon
with acquisition slides than did the inconsistent distractors.
The variables of semantic congruence and featural similarity were
therefore confounded and the differential response to distractors
not necessarily due to fusion. It is more likely that the response
pattern reflected a difference in the featural similarity between
the distractor types and the acquisition slides. The general
thesis is that abstraction cannot be demonstrated in a recognition
memory paradigm unless the semantic congruence and featural simi-
larity of the stimulus material is explicity controlled.
A
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Backqround
An introductory review of the literature traces some of the
seminal work which has led to and influenced the development of
the idea of fusion. A difficulty in putting Jenkins' research
into a theoretical and historical context is that there is no
&Lyeet developmental line of ideas on which fusion can be placed.
However, there are numerous indirect relationships beb'reen fusion
and other lines of research in cognition. The dominant generai
connection is the assumption that perception is determined by
knowledge about the structure of events. This has more general1y
been called world knowledge (Norman & Rumelhart, 1975a) and a
guid,ing princ'ip1e'in many maior studies of cognition has been that
perception, and in turn, memory, is determined by world knowledge.
This supposition has taken many forms, undergone various
refinements, and generated several applications throughout the
literature. It underlies theories of perception and merory which
propose cognit'ive representations such as schemata (Bartlett'
1932- Bobrow & Norman, 1975; Piaget & Inhelder, 1973), proposi-
tions (Anderson & Bower, L974; Kintsch, L97A, 1974, L977),
semantic macro-structures (van Diik, Ig77), frames (Minsky, 1975),
and scripts (Shank & Abelson, 1975). It is the hall-mark of
accounts of cogn'itive processing which emphasise dichotomies of
global versus featural processing (t\avon, 1977), schema versus
d'istinctive feature processing (Pick, 1965), semantic versus
structural process'ing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972), semantic versus
episodic encoding (Tu1ving, Lg72), and propos'itionai versus
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analogue processing (Palmer, 1975a; Pylyshyn, 1975). The idea
that world knowledge controls perception is at the root of studies
of the influence of context (Biederman, L972i Palmer, 1975b)'
organisation (Bower, 1972; Mandler & Johnson, 1976), and meaning
(Norman & Rumelhart, 1975a, 1975b), and the processes of hypothesis
testing (Bruner, 1957), analysis-by-synthesis (Neisser, 1967),
visual abstraction (Posner, 1969; Posner & Keele, 1968, 1970) and
linguistic abstraction (Bransford & Franks, 1971, 1972).
The following review presents a selected cross-section of
related research. The specific connections which governed selec-
tion of these studies were that they adopted a contextualist
approach to cognition, they attempte-d tb demonstrate explic'itly the
influence of world knowledge, the maior variable used in the
dernonstrations was organisation and the stimulus material was
predomi nantly pi ctorial .
Problems of Definition
Many of the crucial tenns and concepts used in this area of
cognitive psychology are only 'loosely.defined. They tend to have
both genera'l and specific meaningsn lay usages and paradigmatic
associations. 0ften, within the 'literature, the particular way in
which a term or concept is used is unc'lear and at times the mean-
ing of the explanatory phrases appears to be idiosyncratically
associated with specific researchers. Where the term in question
1/'
t'-y'1
.,^
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is uniquely associated with a particu'lar writer (for instance, as
'analysjs-by-synthesis' is with Neisser, (1967), little confusion
arises because the precise meaning of the phrase has been well
specified at conception and in general its definition is used
consistently by subsequent writers. However, with the majority of
the terms encountered (for example, the term 'schemar'), serious
comp'lications arise for the reader who is attempting to draw
general conclusions from apparently related research. Difficulties
encountered with the tenm schema will be outlined here because it
is a central term in this thesis.
Bartlett (tl:21 foresaw the problems of definition when he
introduced Head's (1920) term into his study of remembering. He
strongly disliked the term schema as being "at once too definite
and too sketchy" (p. 201). However, he considered it was the best
term to describe the underlying factor which demonstrated the
constructive process in perceptual processing. Bartlett equated
'schema' with 'organi$ed setting' and more elaborately defined the
term in this way:
'schema'refers to an active organ'isation of past
reactions, or of past experiences, which must always be
supposed to be operating in any we'll-adapted organic
response. That is, whenever thene is any order or
regularity of behaviour' a particular response is
possible only because it is related to other similar
responses which have been serially organised, yet which
operate, not simply as individual members coming one
after another, but as a unitary mass. (Bartlett, 1932, p. 201).
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l,lhere the term schema has been used as an explanatory concept
in work subsequent to Bartlett's studies, the nnaning has most
often been different from that proposed by Bartlett, and cgtlS€'
qr.ently the term schema refers to a variety of structures and
processes. tlinograd (L97?), for example, described a schema as
being, at the simplest level, "a description of a comp'lex obiect'
situation, process, or structure" (p. 72)r the emphasis being on
complexity rather than on organisation. Whereas Tulving [1972)
stressed the temporal aspect of schematic organfsation, Al1en'
Siegel and Rosinski [1978) have emphasised the spatial aspect.
Perfetti and Lesgold (1977) described a schema as a l'relatively
smal'f bundle of informatton Ehout a concept" (p. L74), again
removing the emphasis from organisation and placing it on the
notion of information. Neisser's 1976 definition was far more
expansi ve:
a schema is that portion of the entire perceptual
cycle wtr-ich is internal to the perceiver, modifiable
by experience, and sorehow specific to what is being
perceived. The schema accepts infonnation as it
becomes availahle at sensory surfaces and is changed
by that infovrnation; it directs movements and explor-
atory activities that make more information availablen
by which it is further modified' . (lteisser, 1976., p. 54).
Although there is a superficial similarity between these ,.:'
definitions, the meaning of the term schema varl:es in quite
fundamental ways with each author.
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Sorn writers consider that distinction between certain terms
is unnecessary. White (1974) used the tenns 'schema fonnation"
and -'abstraction' interchangeably, and Garner (tgeZ) equated
organisation with meaning. 0ther writers have attempted to sub-
sutne terms under one particular concept, for example Friedman (1979)
defined theories which invoke schemata and scripts as "frame"
theories. It did not seem useful to the present writer either to
create netl{ generic terms for these many-faceted conCepts or'to
treat them as though they were indistinguishable. Rather' an
attempt has been made to describe terms and concepts as specific-
ally as possible as they relate to the usage described by the
individual writers referred to in this thesis.
Context and Features in Perceptual Processing
The studies described in this section have examined the effect
of context on the perception of pictorial stimuli. They show that
context is a crucial determiner of obiect perception but also that
the speci.fic features of obiects are relevant in perceptual
processing decisions. Data from these studies appear to be
conf'licting unless they are accounted for by a model of perceptual
processing which incorporates an irmediate and continuing inter-
act'ion betvreen perception of individual features and the total
composition of those. features.
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The main emphasis of this section is on the work of Biederman
and his associates who examined the'influence of schernta - the
formation of a .holistic representation of a scene - by studying
the effect of context on the perceptual processing of briefly
presented visual images (Biederman, L972; Biederman' Glass &
Stacy, 1973; Biederman, Rabinowitzn Glass & Stacy, L974)'
Biederman's research is discussed 'in detail here for three
main reasons. Firstly, contextual studies were a maior force
behi.nd the polarization of the 'forest versus trees'' debate in
visual perception, and more recently a cata'lyst for reconciliatory
models. The forest versus tree' distinction refers to the
precedence of either global structuring of a visual scene or
feature-by-feature perception (Navon, L977) ' This thesis argues
that a sinilar polarization has occurred in studies of memory
where a distinction has been made between the process'ing of the
semantic charactenistics of the material and the features by
which it is defined.
Secondly Biederman's stimulus material consisted of photo-
graphs of rea'l-world scenes, as did that in the present experi-
ments. This choice was determined by the belief that the study
of cognitive processes will be advanced by the use of stimulus
materials more representative of every-day perception. Biederman
(tslz1 argued that the use of sinple stimuli in perceptual
research had resulted in models which account for laboratory-
situation rather than real-world perception; and that these are
not necessarily one and the same. llle do not normally see "either
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a single item sumounded by homogeneous space or an array of
unrelated ('random!) itemsu (p. 74\, When we look at our world,
the objects vre see are set in relation to other obiects. Rarely
do we look at a thing in isolation, for it usually has a setting
- a meaningful context. It is the factor of meaningful context
which Biederman believed to have been misrepresented or ignored in
many models of perception. Such extensions have been va]uable in
studies of perception, and more recently in environmental studies
of memory $]]en, Siegel & Rosinski, 1978; Pezdek & Evans' 1979;
Pittenger & Jenkins, 1979).
Thirdly Biederman's examination of the influence of context
on visual perception and in turn of the question of holistic and/
or featural processing used disorganisation of stirnulus material
as a way of manipulating its meaning. The variable of organisation
proved to be the crucial variable which tested fusion in the
pr.esent research.
Biederman's studies of the context effect
A number of theoretical issues present themselves
when one attempts to account for. the context effect,
that is the advantage of coherent over iumbled scenes.
One issue concerns identification of the functional
units involved in the perception of scenes. Is the
functional unit an individual object, or does an
observer have access to more global units or schema?
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A second issue is the detennination of the locus,
in the sequence of processing, where context has
its effect. Is it in the initia'l manner in which
objects are physically processed - in the initial
segmentation, testing, and weighing of features?
0r does the context influence a stage subsequent to
that involved in the physical process'ing, so that
physical'ly amhiguous stimuli are interpreted to be
consistent with other aspects of the scene already
identified? (Biederman, 1972, P. 79)
Biederman (L972) set out to demonstrate that meaningfu'lness
is an essential feature of the very earliest stage of perception.
He rneasured the accuracy of subiects' obiect recognition perform-
ance when the context which surrounded the obiect was disordered.
A disordered context was produced by sectioning black and white
photographs of every-day scenes and presenting the sections in a
random arrangement. This type of presentatfon was compared with
an intact version of the photograph where the sections had been
replaced in their correct positions. Each section contained one
well-defined obiect. In this way the meaningfulness of an
object's setting was manipulated by disorganisation fndependently
of the featural complexity of the scene. The subjectrs task was
to decide which one of four obiects presented without any context,
was shown in a cued section of the photograph. The effect of
disorganised presentation was assessed in three ways: Presenta*
tion time was varied, the complete photograph being shown for
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either 300, 500' or 700 msec; the target section was indicated
either before or after presentation of the slide; subjects were
shown the four alternative obiects either before or after presen-
tation of the slide.
0verall, subiects recognised obiects more accurately when the
surrounding context was organised. Duration of presentation did
not produce any consistent effect. Recognition was more accurate
when the section was cued before presentation of the slide and
when the subjects had seen the a'lternatives before the slide.
However, even when subiects knew where to look (cue before) and
what to look for (alternatives shourn before) disorganisation
impeded recognition.
Biederman, Glass and Stacy [1973) extended these findings by
nnasuring the effect of disorganised context on reaction time.
Before each Scene was presented, subiects were shown a picture of
one object and their task was to indicate as quickly as possible
whether the obiect appeared i.n the subsequent scene.
The interest of thiS experiment centred on the 'No' responses'
of which there were two types. l,lhen an obiect did not appear in
the subsequent Scene, e'ither it eould Ttante appeared in such a
scene (fOr instance, the obiect'cup'', followed by a kitchen scene)
or it eaa&d nob';'ha)e appeared in such a scene (for instance' the
object 'cup' being followed by a street scene). There were' there-
fore, two categories of ''No' responses - 'Possib'le-No' and
' Impossible-No'. Overa11, subiects made''Possible-No' decisions
more slowly than ttrmpossible-Nor decisions, and disorganisation
delayed responses in both categories. However, subiects were most
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delayed by a disorganised context when the obiect could have, but
did not, appear in the subsequent scene.
Biederman et al. explained these findings in terms of an
analysis-by-synthesis nurdel of perception, of which "the idea that
a holistic representation can precede - and facilitate - the
process'ing of specific parts is a fundamental tenet" [1973' p. 26).
They reasoned that if the seanch for an obiect involved a Process
where specitic obiects were identified in the course of building
up a representation of an entire scene, then context would not
affect the time or accuracy of obiect identification. However'
since disorganisation delayed perfotmance, the subiect formed a
holistic representation first' and only 'later attended to detai'l.
This interpretation was given additional support by the
difference in reaction times for the two types of 'No' resPonses.
It was proposed that in the 'Impossib'le-No' situation where
reaction times were shOrtero the subiect viewed the scene and
abstracted its general meaning. Since the setting was inapprop-
piate for the target ohject, the. searnch was terminated. In the
'Possible-No' situationo when the subiect discovered that the
setting was an appropriate one for the target obiect, the search
continued until the. r-ndividual objects ih the scene were identified
and rejected. "Here achieving a schema was insuffr'cient and S
would have to engage in detailed feature processing and obiect
identification to determine if the target was in the scene" (1973,
p. 26). The effect of iumbling was greatest in the'Possible-No!
condition since not only would the formation of the holist'ic
representation be more difficult but there wou'ld be the additional
hindrance of identifying an object in a iumbled context.
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In the second study, the model of perceptual processing
proposed by Biederman et al. seemed to depend on a serial process-
ing in which a holistr'c representation is formed before detailed
analysis is undertaken. In later work, however, Biederman specif-
ically proposed a Parallel model of perceptual processing, where a
'holistic representation and detailed ana'lysis are apprehended
s:imul taneously.
Before descpib'ing his later experiments it should be noted
that a parallel model is not inconsistent with the findings of the
second study Since Biederman's interpretation of the differences
in reaction times was based upon an ''additive' approach (Sternberg'
1966). Such interpretations must allow for the fact that exact
time taken for the individual processes which contribute to the
overall latency is not known, and are based on appfoximate esti-
mates of the relative speed of each operation and on the effects
of any interact'ion between them.
Biederman's work at this point had not explicitly demonstrated
a ''forest before trees! type of perceptual process'ing. However, it
Itad denonstrated that the 'forest' is at least present at the very
beg'inning of perceptual processing, since the findings could not
readily be interpreted in terms of a feature-by-feature analysis
preceding a holistic representation. If this position were held,
then one would predict that there would be no overal'l d'ifference
between the 'Possible-No' and !Impossible-No' conditions, since
in both cases the decision would be based on the elimination of
each individua'l obiect (making a holistic representation
redundant). Secondly, therefore, one cou'ld not predict an
- 15-
additive effect of di.sorganisation in the 'Possible-No' condition.
Biederman, Rabinow'itz, Glass and Stacy (1974) examined the
effect of disorganisatton on the identification of a total scene.
They were, therefore, concerned not with the effect of a d'iSor$all-
ised context on an obiect but w'ith the effect of disorganisation
on the perception of an ovenall representation of a scene.
Subjects were shown a variety of Scenes, again either intact or
jumbled. Exposure tirnes varied between 20 msec and 300 msec.
Before viewing a scene, the subiect was shown two verbal descrip-
tions, and was required to select the one which best fitted the
subsequent scene. The pairs of labels were simi'lar (for instance,
'shopping plaza' versus lbusy road and stores') o" dissimilar (for
instance 'lawn in back of house.' versus !kitchenl). Correct
responses were predetermined by iudges. Disorganisation affected
accuracy, particularly at exposure times of 100 and 300 msec, and
decisions were more accurate when labels were dissimilar.
In this third study, Biedennan appeared to change the direc-
tion of his argument. In his interpretation of the two earlier
studies he proposed two types of operations - the perception of a
holistic representation and the identification of individua'l
objects. He reasoned that the holistic representation is formed
first and facilitates the perception of individual obiects.
However, the interpretation of the results of the third study
emphasised the irunediacy of the perception of individual obiects.
Biederman argued that when labels are dissimilar, subjects
may base their dect'sion on the identification of certain
'diagnostic'objects. For instance, if a subject were given the
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labels 'fire-place' Versus 'parking lot in front of stores' he may
view the scene and once he had identified a car' decide that the
scene is not of a fireplace. If the ]abels were similar, for
instance, in the 'shopping plazar versus 'buSy road and stores*
compapison, he may, having identified a shop and some peop'le, not
have enough information to arrive at a decision. It is at this
point, that "perhaps S also employed a second, more holistic mode
of processing which made use of the spatial relations among the
objects in the scene to he]p him distinguish, SdY, "shopping
plazal from lbusy road and stores"'(Biederman et al.1974, p.599).
Although it appears from this interpretation that Biederman
now suggested a 'trees before forest' approach to perceptual
processing, he concluded this series of experiments by postulating
a parallel model which he considered the best interpretation of
all the available data. :'It is 'likely that S simultaneously
handles the information from a scene with both modes. That is,
individual objects would be identified along with the attainment
of the overall scene characterisation" (p. 600). Later experinnnts
by Biederman which examined specific kinds of relationship viola-
tions in irnongruous scenes confirmed his view that "knowledge of
physica'l relatjons is not necessarily available prior to knowledge
of semantic relat'ions - indeed, they may be one and the same"
(tgll, p. BB),
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Extension of Biederman's St!41e!
Biedennan's research has been extended in several directions,
and the results in general have converged towards a dual-processing
(parallel) model of visua'l perception. Antes (tSll1, expanded the
research to include an examination of the infonnativeness of
pictures; Hock and his colleagues (Hock, Gordon & Corcoran,
1976; Hock, Gordon & Whitehurst, L974; Hock, Romanski, Ga'lie &
|/i1Iiams, 1978) studied the effect of fami'liapity of pictures,
and Palner (1975b) investigated the degree of contextual meaning-
ful ness.
Antes (L977) combined Biedermanrs method with a technique
developed by Mackworth and I'lorandi (1967) which measured accuracy
of perception as a function of the 'informativeness' of sections
of pictures. He found that both recognition and location accuracy
depended on the rated informativeness of a probed section, as well
as the section's location with respect to the point of focus, Like
Biedennan, he interpreted his results in terms of a model of
picture perception based on two kinds of processing - identifica-
tion of individua'l objects and a holistic characterisation of the
scene.
A main aim of Hock's work [Hock, Gordon & Corcoran, 1976;
Hock, Gordon & ll|hitehurst, L974; Hock, Romanski, Galie & t,Iillians,
1978) was to examine the effects of 'familiarity'n 'Plausibility',
and 'belongingness' on recognition memory for organised versus
disorganised scenes. Hock atternpted to refine Bfederman's model
of perceptual processing by incorporating these additional
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factors, and examined whether 'real-world' schemata were genera-
'lisable to all scenes or whether they were functional only with
familiar arrangements of obiects.
Hock hypothesised that it is the familiarity of inter-obiect
relations that determines the inf1uence of schemata. He systemat-
ically varied arrangements and selections of objects in scenes to
assess subjects' performance on S6ffi8-different comparison percept*
ual tasks, word-to-picture matching tasks, and recognition memory
tasks. Aithough the intention was to formulate a general model of
perceptual processing, the results were difficult to interpret
except in terms of individual differences.
lillhilst some subiects were influenced only by plausibi'lity,
others were affected only by fami'liarity and belongingness on the
same-different perceptual task. It was inferred that some
subjects used internalised rule systems to agsemble amays of
objects into organised scenes, whereas others dealt with each
object on an individual basis. Similarly, individual differences
were found in the word-to-picture and recognition memory tasks.
For example, on a task requiring subjects to indicate when there
was a match between a word and a simultaneously presented picture
(where the word was either a specific description or a general
category descpipt'ion, €.9. picture of a collie dog being paired
with either 'collie'or 'dog') it was found that some subiects
adopted an analytical mode of pfocessing, concentratt'ng on the
minimum number of features necessary for identification' whereas
other subiects adopted a structural mode of processing, concen-
trating on all the information in the pictures.
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Hock and his colleagues concluded that the fact that there
were individual types of responses to such tasks indicated that
seeming]y conflicting theories of visual processing might be
cornpatible. In particular they suggested that Bruner's (]957)
theory which stressed the importance of placing stimuli into
categories on the basis of featural lnfo!'mation extracted from the
stimuli and Neisser's (tgeZ) theory which emphasised a synthetic
rather than an; analyticapproach, m'ight both be valido depending
upon the particular perceptual processing mode used by different
i ndi vi dual s.
An attempt was made to resolve the apparent conf'lict by
proposing a two-stage model of perceptua'l processing in which
schemata are finned at the first stage and govern the process'ing
of details at the second stage. They suggested that there are
three levels of real-v{orld schemata in scene recognition. At the
'deepestf (most abstract) leve'l' are schemata comprising generaliz-
able rules that specify the relationa'l possibilities of obiects.
These abstract schemata are the basis for the formation of episodic
schemata to represent the particular scenes. A third type -
categorical schemata - occupies the level of abstractedness
intermediate to deep-level rule systens and surface-level epjsodic
schemata.
Hock's suggestion that the
before trees' models may not be
some combinat'ion of both seems
'trees before forest' and 'forest
incompatible has merit in that
essential if apparently conflicting
data is to be explained. However, the model suggested invokes
categories of schemata for which there appears to be little
-20-
empirical support. It also has
may limit rather then elucidate
processing. An alternative waY
of perceptual processing models
(1975b, 1975c, 1977).
a rigidity of formulation which
an understanding of PercePtual
of combining the two main tYPes
has been suggested by Palmer
In discussions of the nature of perceptual representation,
Palmer (1975a, 1978) has argued that when different theories of
perceptual processing are presented within an adversary context'
few advances will be rnade in understanding perceptual processing
since more extreme positions are then chosen to enhance defence.
A.compromise is needed to develop theories which more adequately
account for conflicting data, and models which provide more
realistic representations of the perceptual operations involved.
Palmer dernnstrated the need for such a synthesis in a study which
deve'loped the work begun by Biederman.
Palmer (1975b) examined the effect of context on obiect
identification by varying the appropriateness of the context of an
object whilst keeping the organisation of the scene intacto
rather than by varying its spat'ial order. Specific obiects were
paired with scenes which were either appropriate (for instanceo a
loaf of bread on a kitchen bench) or inappropriate ffor instance,
a mail box on the bench); the obiects were also presented without
context. l^lhen an object was paired with an inappropriate context,
it could be either similar in features to an obJect for which the
context would be approPriate (-as in the above example where the
mailbox was similar in shape and size to the loaf of bread), or
dissimilar in features (for example, a drum on the kitchen bench).
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subjects were more 1ikely to identify a briefly presented
p.icture of an obiect correctly when it was preceded'by an approp-
riate contextual scene than when it was preceded by a blank slide'
They were least likely to identify the obiect when it was preceded
by an inappropriate context. confidence ratings of responses were
a function of the visua] similarity between the target object and
the object to which it was to be matched, subjects being 'less
conf.ident with visually similar obiects. Palmer concluded that
the experiment showed that both the context and the sensory
characteristics of the presented obiect determined the response
made by the subiect. That is to say, that neither a 'forest
before trees' nor a 'trees before foreSt! explanatiOn adequate'ly
accounted for the data. Palmer (1975c, 1977\ developed an inter-
pretation of these findings 'in terms of a visual processing model
which involved simultaneous use of both holist'ic and featural
encoding. His model, although similar to Biederman's emphasised
the interactive nature of the process and was set within the
framework of the 'parsing problem':
How can someone recognise a face until he has first
recognised the eyes, nose' mouth, and ears? Then
again, how can someone recognise the eyes' nose'
mouth, and ears until he knows that they are part
of a face? (Palmer, 1975c, P. 295).
In an attempt to resolve the parsing problern he adopted
premise that the fundamental factor in perceptual processing
the
is
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neither the ; holistic representation nor the featural characteris'
tics of the stimulus but the interaction which takes place between
these bto aspects of stimuli:
The proposal....incorporates a constant interplay
between the external sensory information and
internal conceptual information. lTtis interaetion
is the heut of the pereephtaL eystem-r' Sensory
features 'look for' possible interpr"etations within
the available conceptual schematao and the possible
interpretations'look for' confirrning sensory
information anpng the features being extracted.
Generalty speaking, the facilitating effect of this
type of system is that once a member within a schema
has been advanced as a candidate interpretation, the
rest of the units within the scherna provide 'expec-
tations' about what else should be found and where
these things should be located. (Palmer, 1975c, p. 295).
The model proposed by Palmer, therefore, was based on the
belief that al1 types of information [from the most specific to
the most general) defining a given stimulus are simultaneously
available and are used in the perceptual processing of that
stimulus. Any model which embodies a constant interplay between
these types of information must accordingly provide for' 'cormun-
ication' bettreen them.
Palmer's model defined perceptual representations as "highly
I Italics added
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organised data structures containing many embedded 'levels of
detail" LLg77, p. 442). ltlany leve]s of structure are needed to
contain all information about a stimulus which includes its globa:l
properties, its component parts and the specific perceptual rela-
tionships between them. The cornponent parts in turn have global
properties and further component parts.
Such a view of the infonnation contained within a stimulus is
conceptua'lised as a multi'leveled hierarchical structure of parts
and wholes, each of which has a representation both of the holistic
properties and the component structure. Each structural unit which
contains information about a stimulus is viewed as a level in a
hierarchy, where the highest level structural unit represents the
figure as a whole wr'th 91oba1 properties of the most general
nature, the next-lower level structural units define less general
aspects, and so on. The entire network which defines one stimuius
and which is dominated by the h'ighest structural unit is called
its schema "The schema integrates all of the information known
about the scene, Obiect, or part into a systematic framework used
during perceptuai processing" t1977' p. 444\" Integration occurs
by a testing process between the individual structurai units and
between the schema and the to-be-identified stimulus, with the aim
of achieving the greatest concordance in the most efficient manner.
The approach adopted by Palmer is basical'ly functional in that
rather than describing the processing of a given stimu'lus in terms
of a predetermined perceptua'l system, he describes the system in
terms of the stimulus - a view in many ways consistent with
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Gibson's (tSe01 ideas of percept'ion. Specifically he makes the
point that only the amount and kind of information needed to
discriminate any given stimulus is used in its processing, The
system itself, therefore, provides for potential use of all levels
of information, and more importantly provides both for the forma-
tion of schemata in the first instance and for their later use and
modification - a provision without which the parsing problem would
undermine any model of processing.
Surmar_v
The data frpm the perceptual processing studies described in
this literature review cannot be accounted for adequately either
by 'schema-based' or by 'feature-based' theories. Biederman's
studies showed that spatial disorganisation impaired accuracy of
object recognition in briefly presented pictorial scenes even when
the target obiect and its focal position were cued. They also
showed that subjects took 'longer to decide that an obiect was not
present in a scene when it could reasonably have been expected to
appear in the scene than when its presence wou'ld not have made
sense. Moreover the decision time was even 'longer when the scene
was disorganised. In the studies which examined verb'al 1abe11ing
of total scenes, accuracy was impaired both. by disOrganisation of
scene presentation and by sfmilarity of 'label choices. Btlederman
concluded that the combination of these findings showed that both
the overalJ composition of a scene and its component parts
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detennine perception at the most inrnediate stage'
These conclusions were confirmed by studies which extended
the variables of interest. Antes showed that the informativeness
of individual portions of pictures .was' as important hs their
context. Hock found that when the variables of famflt'arity'
plausabi'lity, and belongingness were i'ntroduced into contextual
studies, some subjects processed material in a global-way but
others focused their attention on indivr'dual features. Palmer
demonstrated that individual features become .relevant,
wh.en the appropriateness of an obiect's context was .varied'.
A perceptua'l processing model such as that proposed by Palmer'
specifying a constant interaction between schemata and features,'i's
needed to make sense of the. context studies which showed that:both
the holistic scene and the specifics which define it are used in
the formation of its perceptual representation.
The Role of Schemata in lvlemorv'
The attempt made by Palmer and others to reconcfle conf'lict-
ing theories of perception provides an important guideline for
developing accounts of the processes of visual memory. In the
study of memory, a dichotomous approach towards aspects of the
retained material has tended to polarize accounts of memory
processes into schematic-based and featural-based theories in much
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the sarne way as in the study of visual percept'ion. In particular
a distinction has been made bet!',een the semantic and featural
aspects of stimuli. This in turn has led to distinctions between
the semantic and featural aspects of memory itself. Such distinc-
tions tend to generate models of memory which emphasise one aspect
at the total expense of the other. It wi'll be argued here that
this has been the case particularly with the schematic*based
theories of memory which have placed such emphasis on the semantic
aspects of the stimu'li that the role of featural aspects has been
overl ooked.
An examination of the data on which some maior studies of
memory are based shows that findings which are used to support
notions of schemata and abstraction can be explained empirically
in terms of the featural aspects of the stimulus material without
any feference to the semantic. It is not argued here that
semantic, any more than featural aspects' are unimportant but
rather than interpretations of data which do not give sufficient
attention to the featural aspects of stimuli may result in mis-
leading explanatory concepts.
The rnain focus of this section is the work of two research
groups which have attempted to demonstrate the effects of schemata
on recognition memory. The first group is represented by a series
of experiments by Jean Mandter and her colleagues CMandler &
Johnson, tg76; Mandler & Parker, 1976; Mand'ler & Ritchey' L977).
The nnin reason for examining Mand'ler's work in detailo was that
like Biddennan, she varied the spatia'l organisation of p'ictorial
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scenes as a way of manipulating meaning and attempting to demon-
strate the influence of world knowledge. Moreover, Mand'ler's
procedure of examining remory for specific information v'ia system-
atic transformation of distractors was adopted. in the present
research as a way of standardizing distractors-
The second group is represented by the linguistic abstraction
work of Bransford and Franks (1971, L972), who claimed not only
to have demonstrated that a holistic representation is fomed
from separate units of information presented over time but also
that the 'holistic representation is remembered and not the indi-
vidual units of information. Bransford and Franks' studies provide
an investigation of verbal material which closely parallels
Jenkins' studies of fusion in visual material'
Mandler's stydies of spatiql organisation
If one assumes that schemata',..are used during
the encoding process then the extent to which.
pictures fit those schemata should influence how
wel1 they are remembered and perhaps what types
of information are remembered. llle are using the
concept of schema to refer to an internal struc-
ture, developed through experience with the world,
which organises incoming information relative to
previous experience. [Mandler & Parker, 1'976,
p. 3e).
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lhndler argued that the extent to which a picture was
organised would affect the extent to which it tactivated' a real-
world schema. Therefore, manipulation of the organisation of a
picture could provide a means for examining the influence of
schemata on merpry for pictures. Specifically, Mandler predicted
that retention of certain types of information would be enhanced
by activation of a real-world schema, whilst others would not be
affected. A classification system was developed to describe
various types of pictorial inforrnation.
The classification was not designed to give an exhaustive
analysis of the kinds of information which are contafned in a
picture, but only to identify scrne main types of information. The
underlying methodological rationale was that examination of memory
for specific types of information, may show what aspects of
pictorial stimuli determine the accuracy and durability of memory.
To examine parti.cular types of information, Mandler systematically
varied the di.stractors used in recogntition tests by makfng trans'
fonnations of pictures shown during acquisition.
A complete. list of transformations (and the types of pictor-
ial information they varied) used during the course of Mandlen's
experiments, is set out below:
-29-
Type of Information
1. Inventory: specified
the obiects contained
in a picture'
2. Descriptive:
specified the figura-
tive detail of obiects
in the inventorY.
3. Soatial Location or
Relat!pn: sPecified
where obiects were
in relation to one
another.
4. Spatial Composition:
specified areas of
fiiled versus emPtY
space in the overa'll
composition of the
picture.
Tvpe of Transformation
Type: an object rePlaced with an
object of the same shaPe and size
but of a different conceptual class.
Token: a change in the figurative
detail of an obiect.
Reamangement: an interchange of
the position of two obiects.
Size: an obiect made larger or
smal 1er.
Ori entation :
object with
ori entat'ion .
Move: an
Del eti on :
Addi ti on :
a reversa'l of an
respect to left-right
object moved slightlY.
an object removed.
an object added.
l,landler and Parker (L976) suggested that real-world schemata
should particularly facil'itate memory for spatial location (or
relation) information. Transformations of spatial'location'
therefore, should be more easily detected 'in organised (as opposed
to unorganised) pictures. Other types of jnformation should be
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less dependent on schemata and, therefore, be less affected by
manipulations of organi sation.
Subjects were shown b'lack and white photographs of complex
line drawings. Each drawing, which was presented for 20 seconds,
consisted of eight well-defined obiects which were either
organised to represent a real-World scene or unorganised' merely
representing a co|lection of unrelated obiects. In this early
experiment, two types of memory test were used and the procedure
was not typical of the later experiments. To assess rnemory for
descriptive information, subiects were given an obiect recognition
test. They were shown pictures of each of the eight obiects which
had appeared in the scene. The distractors varied figurat'ive
detail, size, and orientation.2 When the subiects had selected
the eight objects which they thought were present in the original
picture, they were asked to place them in a b'lank frame in the
position in which they had originally been shown. This spat'ial
reconstruction test measured memory for spatial location. The
retention period was varied by testing subiects either inrnediately
and then again one week later, or only after a one week de1ay.
t In this experiment, where size and orientation of an obiect
were varied in isolation from other obiects, spatial re'lationships
were not affected and a'll three transformations were, therefore,
described as varying descriptive information.
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The object recognition test shovled that memory for figurative
detail was better than memory for size or orientation. Descriptive
information was more accurately recognised in the inmediate test
than in either of the delayed tests (which were not significantly
different from each other)' Organisation did not afrfect memory
for descriptive information but affected memory for spatial loca*
tion since organised p'ictures were reconstructed more accurately
than unorganised Pictures.
It was concluded that spatial r€;l,ationships between obiects
are easier to remember when the obiects are arranged in an
organised (real-world) pattern than when they are unorganised.
l',,lemory for descriptive informationo however, is not affected by
the way in which obiects are aryanged. 0n the basis of these
findings, the authors suggested that "real-world schemata have
less effect on recognition of descriptive detail than on spatial
relationsh'ips among objects" (Jtland'ler & Parker, L976, p. 46).
Mand,ler and Johnson (1976) extended the examination of
memory for different types of Pictopial information' As in the
earlier study, subiects were shown either organised or unorganised
collections of obiects. lvtemory for all four types of information
(inventoryo descpiptive, spatial 'location (or relation)' and
spatia'l composition) was assessed by systematically transforming
distractors in an inmediate recognition test. Five transformations
were used - type, token, rearrangement, deletionn and move.
Qrganisation did not affect memory for inventory or descrip-
tive infovmation. However, spatial location (or relation)
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information was more accurate for organised pictures whereas
mefipry for spatial composition was more accurate for unorganised'
unrelated collections of obiects.
The interpretation given of the differential effect of
orEanisation was that spatial locatrlon info!"mation was the key to
a picture's meaningfulness and thiS type of infoprnation was there-
fore particularly important in organised pictures. l'landler and
Johnson suggested that when a subiect Views an organised scene'
attention is focused on spatia'l location information to the detri-
nent of spatial composition information. However, when a subiect
views an unorganised scene, which has no overa'|1 meaning, spatial
location information is less relevant and, therefore, spatial
composition information is processed more thoroughly than in an
organised scene.
Mandler and Ritchey (]SZZ1 examined the nature of merpry for
spatial information in greater detail. Three more transformations
were added to the set of distractors. Spatial composition was now
varied not only by deletions and moves but also by the addttion of
an object. Spatia'l location (or relation) information was tested
by varying an obiect's size and orientation as well as by
rearranging objects. Inventory informat'ion was stili assessed by
the type transformation, and descriptive information by the token
transformation. Pictures were pfesented for ten seconds and
organisation was manipu'lated as in previous experiments.
Recognition tests were either immediate, or after delays of one
day, one week, or four months.
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Particular interest lay in the four month condition. Since
research with verbal material had indicated that semantic content
rather than structural presentation tends to be well retained over
long periods, Mandler and Ritchey predicted that information more
relevant to pictorial rneaning might be expected to be retained for
longer than other types of information. They proposed that
spatial location (or re'lation) and tinventory information are more
central to a picturets meaning than either spatial composit'ion or
descri ptive i nformati on.
The main prediction, therefore, was that spatia'l locat'ion
(or relat'ion) and inventory information would be better recognfsed
than either spatia'l composition or descriptfve infoYmation after a
four month delay and also be more affected by the manipulation of
organisation. If an unorganised picture is meant'ngless and does
not activate a real-world schema, then spatial location [or
relation) and inventory information shou'ld not be better remembered
than spatial composition and descriptive information,given long
retention intervals where the acquisition stimuii had been
unorganised.
The major finding was a significant three-way interaction
between type of transformation, retention period, and organisation.
Recognition of spatial location for relation) information declined
only marginally over four months giVen organi'sed pictures, whereas
there v{as a highly significant decline over the same period for
unorganised pictures. I'lhere transfonnations varied addition or
deletion (spatial composition infonnation) and type (inventory
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infonnation), there was a significant decline in performance over
four months with organised pictures. Howevern there was no decline
with unorganised pictures. Moreover, in the case of the spatial
composition transformations, inmediate testing performance was
better with unorganised than organised pictures. Mandler and
Ritchey accounted for this effect by arguing that addition and
deletion transformations varied not only spatial composition but
also inventorY information;
At inrnediate test, the spatial composition infor-
mation is avai'lable, but as it drops out' these
changes can be detected on the basis of the
inventory of obiects. since inventory information
is better retained in organised pictures, recogni-
tion of addition and deletion 'in unorganised
pictures suffers in the long run. (Mand'ler & R'itchey,1977' p-395).
Mand'ler and Ritchey concluded that since disorganisation
impaired recognition of inventory and spatial location [or re]ation)
information, these types of information are contained in the scene
schema aCtivated by real-world ofgan'isation. However "the scene
schema does not include descriptive inf,ormation about the obiects
or the overall spatia'l composition of the scene" (p. 395)' since
these types of information are processed independently of organis-
ati on.
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Surmarv and criticism
A criticism of Mandler's experiments is that they involve an
ignoratio elenchi. They first proposed that the activat'ion of
neal-world schemata facilitates the retention of certain types of
pictorial information. They next assumed that organised as
opposed to unorganised scenes activate real-world schernata. They
then predicted that certain kinds of information would be better
rernembered in organised pictures. 0n observing this to be the
case, they concluded that the activat'ion of real-world schemata
was responsible for superior retention. It is obviously unneces-
sary to postulate real-world schemata at all, far less maintain
that the data support their existence. The point demonstrated was
that spatial organisation is a critical variable in memory for
pictures and affects the featural aspects of pictorial material
which are related to spatial relationships'
The empirical findings of Mandler's experiments were that the
variable of spatial organisation did not affect memory for the
figurative detail of individual obiects in a scene' nor their
unique movement, addition, or deletion. A1though jt was argued
that inventory information was affected by organisation' this was
not a consistent finding since neither Mandler and Johnson (1976)
nor Mandler and Ritchey (1977) obtained an effect at irrunediate
testing. The variable of spat'ial organisation affected precisely
what it was manipuiating - the spatiai relationships between a
group of individual obiects. Moreover this did show that meaning-
ful contextual arrangements of obiects Were easier to remember
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than meaningless arrangements under some circumstances. However,
memory for the specific components of the scenes was also relevant
to overall recognition performance. The experirnent did not demon-
strate the existence of real-rrnrld schemata.
Bransford and Franks' studies of linouistic abstraction
Bransford and Franks (1971), aimed "to lend some precision
to Bartlett's (1932) notions of abstract schemas as ultat is
Lewned' (p. 332). Specifically, they attempted to deronstrate
the phenomenon of ''linguistic abstraction' - the spontaneous
organisation and'integration of information fnom a series of
discrete but related sentences into a coherent holistic story.
The experimental technique designed to dernonstrate abstraction
involved the presentation of a story by its component parts over a
series of trials. Subiects were presented with four stories each
of which consisted of four basic ideas (or propositions). Trials
consisted of the presentation of sentences which could contain one'
bvo, or three of the four propositions contained in the story.
For example, the celebrated 'ants and ielly story consisted of
four propositions:
The ants were in the kitchen.
The ielly was on the table.
The iel1y was sweet.
The ants ate the iellY.
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The four sentenCeS above were referred to as 'OneS'' Since
they each contained only one proposition. 'Twos' were made by
combining ones , for instance - the ants in the kitchen ate the
je]ly. Similarly, 'threes' could be formed - the ants ate the
sweet jelly which was on the table. In acquisition, subiects were
shown selections of ones' twos, and threes for each story in the
group but were never shown any of the complete four-propositional
sentences - for example, in the ants story the complete sentence
was - the ants in the kitchen ate the sweet jelly which was on the
tabl e.
Learning was incidentaln with subiects being asked elliptical
questions about sentences as they were presented (e.9. Did what?
where?). In the subsequent recognition test, distractors consisted
of any ones , twos' and 'threes' which had not been shown during
acquisition, the fours which contained the entire story, and some
'non-cases' in which propositions from different stories had been
combined. Subiects were asked to distinguish between old and new
sentences and to rate their confidence in the correctness of their
decision on a scale of L to 5 where 1 indicated low confidence and
5 indicated high confidence. in their data analysis of recognition
memory performance, Bransford and Franks assigned a plus to any
,,Yes, seen before" responses and a minus to any "No, not seen
before" responses, thereby creating a Scale from -5 to +5, where
+5 meant that the subject was highly confident that he had seen
the test stimulus before.
There were two main findings. Subiects did not
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discriminate between old and new sentences with the exception that
they detected the non-cases as new and also tended to discriminate
between new and old ones..3 The second finding vrhich is known as
.the cornplexity effect'', was that the more complex a sentence was
(i.e. the greater the number of propositions it contained)' the
more certain were subiects that they had seen it before. Subiects
were virtually always certain that they had seen the fours ' even
though these sentences had not been shown during acquisition'
Bransford and Franks argued that during processing of the
acquisition sentences, subiects formed a unified representation
of the reaning of each story and that during recognition they
compared the test sentences against this 'holistic memory trace'
They proposed a schema-based model of memory where individuals
construct holistic concepts on the basis of separate units of
information. Recogn'ition of an item seen during acqu'isition is
determined by the extent to which it deviates from the'holistic
concept. False acceptance of new items is rmonotonically re'lated
3 It should be noted that in the first two of the three experiments
in this study the discrimr'nation performance is not particularly
meaningful given that the proportion of olds to news was 88 to 12
in the first experiment and 100 to 0 in the second and there was
no attempt to measure response bias. In the third experiment there
was an equal proportion of olds to news.
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to the degree to which new items are consistent vlith the holistic
concept. In otlrcr words, it is the abstracted idea or event which
is stored in memory rather than the specifics which have defined
it.
The possibi'lity that the syntactic structure of the items
play a role in ren$bering was not discounted by Bransford and
Fnanks. They suggested that subiects retain "information about
the general style in which the semantic information was originally
expre5sed" (1971, p. 349). However, the dorninant interpretation
of their data was that a schema is formed via temporal integration
when a series of related items are presentedn and that this schema
is the main determiner of memory performance.
These studies of verbal abstraction were interpreted by Jenk'ins
directly in terms of fusisn:
The subiects have used the various strands repeatedly
available in the texture of the experiment to
construct four events that are gompletelydescribed
by the four long complex sentences. 0nce the fusion
of strands into events (has ) occurred....the subiect
cannot perform an analysi s to recover the exact
pattern of input that furnished support for the
construction that he made. (Jenkins, 1974, p' 790)'
Bransford and Franks' seninal study has been influential
in the study of abstraction. In a 1972 review of studies of
'linguistic abstraction which has used their procedure, Bransford
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and Franks reported replications of the basic response pattern
they had observed under conditions where acquisition instructions
were varied, bottr recall and recognition test procedures were
used, and where. the types of stimuli included both abstract and
concrete sentences, visual geornetric patterns, and connected
discourse. There seemed to be strong support for an abstraction
i nterpretati on. ,
Although Bransford and Franks appeared to provide a direct
method for examining linguistic abstraction, from which extensive
study of the phenomenon could develop, alternative models have
been proposed to account for these data. Singer and Rosenberg
(1973) attempted to construct a model of the recognition process
by proposing that with related material from which a central
concept has been abstracted, individual items are assigned weights
proportional to their centrality to the total concept. They
suggesbd it is ttn reiative we'ighting that determines recognition
performance.
Reitman and Bower (tgzg) proposed what Flagg (1976) 'later
termed the 'tally model'. This model assumed that as each item
is presented during acquisition, subiects store the entire item
but the strength of the memory tag given to any one'item is
determined by the number of components of which it is composed.
Tags are stored in memory not only for the total item, but for al'l
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its component sub-items. During the recognition test, subiects
tally the number of tags associated with any one item and the
greater the number of tags an item has, the more likely a subiect
is to judge that he has seen it before. l,|ith such a system,
compleX sentences necessarily accumulate'larger tallies and are'
therefore, falselY accepted.
Flagg,s (1976) test of this model argued that if all 'ones
from a complex sentence were presented (and no twos , threes',
or fours'), then in the recognition test the abstraction and tal1y
rnodels would predict different results. According to Bransford and
Franks' formulation, subiects would think that they had seen the
four before because they would have spontaneously integrated the
propositions presented in the individual 'ones and compared the
four to the integrated schema. In contrast, the tally model
would predict a decrement in recognition confidence as the items
becare more complex, since the acquisit'ion jtems had each been
assigned only one tag, and overall there would be a smaller number
of tags associated with the selected sentence than with other
fours The results supported the tally model.
An 'attribute frequency mode'l' proposed by Neumann (1974)
argued that recognit'ion penformance is a function of the frequency
with which each item and each combination of items has occurred
during learning. He tested this explanation using geometric
stimuli and found that when the frequency with which individual
items and combinat'ions of items presented during acquisition were
varied systematically, those items having a high frequency of
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presentation tended to receive the highest positive confidence
rating. He argued that a frequency rather than abstraction inter-
pretation of the data was more plausible.
Although Bransford and Franks' studies have sttmulated a
development of abstraction-type theoretical formulations, consid*
eration of their merits is not an issue if the data on which they
are based !€re;-actual ly an artefact of the prOcedure used. That the
results of Bransford and Franks' experiments are unlikely to be
due to the under'lying semantic content of the series of items is
ind'icated by Katz and Gruenewald's (i974) and Reitman and Bower's
(1973) findings that the complex'ity effect occurs with meaningless
stimuli. More specifica'lly, and most pertinent to the present
thesisril€ the arguments put fonrard by White (1974) and Jarnes
and Hillenger t1977) that the method designed by Bransford and
Franks confounds abstraction of the schema with confusion with
respect to the surface structure of the individual items.
In a learning paradigm, where remembering specific features
is not required and where the individual items are extremely
similar, it is likely that subiects cannot distinguish between olds
and neras because they are confused with respect to the features of
the material, not because new items are semantica'l1y consistent with
the abstracted schema. The monotonic relationship between complex-
ity and confidence in these experiments may therefore reflect the
degree of confusion rather than an underlying process 0f abstraction.
I,,lhite [1974) argued that Bransford and Franks' procedure of
using a semantic task in the incidental learning procedure minimised
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retention of the individual items of which the complete story was
comprised. He, therefore, coryared two types of 'learning proced-
ures * an intentional condition where subiects were instructed to
listen to each of the sentences carefully fn order to remember
them for a 'later recognition test' and an incidental condition
where subjects were asked to rate each acquisition sentence for
its irnagery value. White found that whilst the performance pattern
of the incidental group'ctrosely resembled the results'
of the Bransford and Franks' studies, this was not the case with
the intentional group where subiects tended to discriminate between
olds and news and where the complexity effect was not present since
subjects were no more confident in their false acceptance of fours
than they were of tv'tos.
A more fundamental criticism made by tlhite was that the
combined measure of recognition accuracy and confidence rating
used by Bransford and Franks confounded two different types of
responses. He, therefore, performed an analysis of his data where
recognition performance and confidence in performance were treated
as separate measures. such a separation showed even more c'learly
that subjects in the intentional condition responded differently
from subiects in the incidental condition'
'The recognition performance data provided strong evidence
that subjects in the incidental condition did not discrirninate
between olds and news (with the exception of ones ) whereas in
the in@ntional condition subiects wdre able to make this discrim-
ination. The confidence rating data showed no difference either
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between the intentional and incidental condition or across the
four sentence types. That is to say when the confidence measure
was considered separately from the recognition performance'
subjects were no more confident about their responses to four-
propositional sentences than to any other - the conplexity effect
was not present. Whrlte suggested that when specific features of
sentences are emphasised in a recognition memory task there is a
weaker tendency to abstract ideas. When there is abstraction there
is little discriminat'ion. Abstracting ideas is thus confused with
failure to discriminate.
James and Hillenger (.L977) similarly have argued that:
Although related sentences may be integrated'
Bransford and Franks' results can be predicted on
the basis of interference arising from the differ-
ing degrees of confusability among sentences of
differing comp'lexity. If that can be done, any
reference to integration is unnecessary. (James &
Hillenger, L977, P. 7L?).
They tested Bransford and Franks' procedure by reducing the
similarity andlor l'ist Structure of stlimuli and found that under
these conditi.ons, the ability to remember specific sentences
increased and the effect of rpnotonicity between confidence ratings
and sentence complexi ty decreased.
Using an analysis simi'lar to that suggested by White, they
also found that when confidence ratings were assessed independently
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of recognition response, the monotonic re1ationship was no longer
present. James and Hillenger argued convincing'ly that a confusion
interpretation not on'ly accounts for Bransford and Frankst
results, but also accounts for them with far greater economy than
does any other interpretation. They concluded that:
Although the particular semantic integration
hypothesis proPosed by Bransford and Franks is
false, the potential role on integration cannot
be denied. However, any integration occurring
in this paradigm must be confounded with the
. conf,usion factor....Our Purpose is not to deny
the importance of integration, but to propose
that the search for a paradigm relevant to its
study must continue. (James & Hillenger, 1977, p. 720).
Bransford and Frankst rnethod of examining verbal memory has
been extended to rnemory for pictorial material [Cortis Park &
Whitten II, L9V7; Pezdek' 1978). Howevern neither of these
studies have attempted to clarify the possible confounding of
features and meaning or of confidence rating and recognition
performance.
Pezdek (1978) designed cartoon drawings which could contain
either one, two, three or four components of a total cartoon
picture. Subjects were shown cartoons during acquisition, along
the lines defined by Bransford and Franks, but were given inten-
tional learning instructions, being asked to remember each
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individual item. An intentional rather than incidental learning
paradigm was adopted so that it might later be argued that any
demonstration of abstraction could be said to be attributable to
a spontaneous integration of the component parts.
Although Pezdek found that when subiects falsely accepted
new items, the confidence in their decision was monotonically
related to the complexity of the distractor, old items were
responded to significantly more accurately than were new items.
The pattern of recognition performance found in Bransford and
Franks' studieso therefore, did not appear to extend to pictorial
material. In a second experiment, Pezdek incorporated a modifi-
cation which provided a test of Flagg's tally model. The infor'
mation for a selected 'key' cartoon p'icture was presented solely
as ones during acquisition, whereas the other three cartoon
p.ictures were presented as combinations of ones , twos ' 01"
threes Recognition confidence increased with complexity of the
test item only with cartoon series which had been presented in the
standard manner and in fact decreased with i'ncreasing complexity
of the key cartoon items. Pezdek, therefore, supported the
tal'ly interpretation of Bransford and Franks' studies.
Pezdek's experiments are equally well accounted for by
'confusion' hypothesis. Like 1^1hite (197a), Pezdek obtained
degree of recognition accuracy when subiects were given an
high
intentional learn'ing procedure. This may wel'l have been enhanced
by the fact that the cartoon line drawings were sirnple black and
wh'ite drawings and also by the spatial aspects of pictorial
a
a
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stimuli (with the component parts of each cartoon being in separate
portions of the overall frame). These aspects of the stimuli are
likely to have made the items less similar to each other in terms
of features than were the kind of sentences used in the standard
Bransford and Franks experiments. secondly, and more importantly'
Pezdeko 'like Bransford and Franks, confounded confidence rating
with recogn'ition accuracy in her data analysis'
Cortis Park and Whitten Il (1977) also attempted to replicate
Bransford and Franks' studies. Unlike Pezdek, they used photo-
graphs of real-life events and directly compared the performance
of subjects who saw pictorial stories with the performance of
subjects who saw sentence equivalents and who were asked either to
rehearse the sentences or to construct them into images' They
found that whilst both types of sentence presentation produced
results comparable with those obtained by Bransford and Franks
(when the combined recognition .and confidence measure was used),
the group who saw pictorial materia'l discriminated between olds
and news and did not exhibit the complexity effect. These results
were found with both an intentional and an incidentai learning
procedure.
Although there was no expiicit attempt either to separate
or confidence rating from recognitionfeatures from mean'ing,
response, the authors
properties of Pictures
for their results:
suggested that the salience of the featural
compared to sentences may have accounted
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Previous abstraction research has used stimuli that
were either more abstract (dot patterns, sentences'
digit or letter strings) or more impoverished
visually (geometric fonns) than real-world scenes'
When one considers how markedly different real-
world scenes are from these other stimuli, partic-
ularly on the dimensions of specificity and richness
of detail, it seems less surprising that the scenes
are not recognised in a manner ana'logous to these
other stimuli. (Cortis Park & Whitten II, 1977, pp. 536-7).
The''Pictorial Supe.riority' Effect
Early studies suggested that memory for pictorial material
was virtually limitless. Shepard (1967) showed subiects over 600
pictures. in a subsequent forced-choice recognition test, 99.7%
Were correctly recognised. A week later recognition performance
had dropped to 87% correct choice and only after 120 days did
recognition memory for the pictures fall to chance level. Later
studies produced even more impressive resu'lts. Standing (1973)
presented subiects with pictures over a period of five days and
estimated a total retention of 6,600 items from a pool of 10,000.
Standing, Conezio and Haber (1970) showed subiects 2,560 photo-
graphs, each appearing for five to ten seconds. In this situation'
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recognition performance exceeded 90% accuracy in a paired forced-
chOice recognition procedure even with a mean retention interval
of 1..5 days. High levels of accuracy have been denpnstrated both
with recognition and recall procedures (Bousefield, Esterson &
Whitmansh, 1957) and retention seems to be excel'lent over long
periods of time (Nickerson, 1968).
Memory for pictorial material appears to be superior to memory
for corresponding verbal descriptions, both with simple material
(Davies, Milne & Gh.nnie, L973; Jenkins, Neale & Deno, L967;
Paivio & Csapo, 1969, 1973) and with complex material (Dallett
Wilcox, 1968; Nelson, Metzler & Reed, L974). Pictures result
better perfonnance than words in a seria'l position reca'll task
involving both a temporal and spatial component (A1|ik & Siegel,
lg74). In a 1969 study of memory for visual versus verbal
stimuli, Haber's finding of 'pictorial superiority',led him to
suggest that recognition melnory for pictures may be unlimited.
A main question emerged from the early studies of memory for
visua'l material: why is memory for pictures superior to memory
for verbal material? This question has generated many models of
lptnory which, because of the apparent differences in perfpnnance
as a function of the type of stimulus materia'|, assume separate
pictorial and verbal memory systems. One of the most influential
of these hual-code'' models has been that proposed by Paiv'io (1971'
1975) who has suggested that there are two functiona'lly distinct
but part'ially interconnected mernory systems, one of which processes
and stores verbal (or propositional) 'information, and the other of
&
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which encodes and stores visual (or imaginal) information. Paivio
has argued that the pictorial superiority effect is due to
pictorial material being more likely than verbal materJal to be
encoded and stored in both systems ando therefore, more effectively
remembered. Other models of memory have particularly emphasised
the imagery aspect of pictorial material. One of the ch'ief propon-
ents of imagery accounts of pictorial memory is Kosslyn (1975).
The imagery debate has occupied a large area of cognitive psychology
in recent years, Pylyshyn (1973, 1975) being the main opponent of
imagery accounts. For a review of the'maior points of contention
in this area see Kosslyn (1978).
Although some research has suggested that there is an inde-
pendence of verbal and visual codes of the same stimuli (gahrick &
Bahrick, L97ti Bahrick & Boucher, 1968), the maiority of studies
which have examined an interaction between verbal and visual infor-
mation have found an interdependence which suggests that there are
not separate codes.
Mennry for ambiguous line drawings is determined by the labels
attached to those drawings (Carmichael, Hogan & Walter' 1932). If
a subject verbally describes a scene at the same time as viewing
it, subsequent recognition perfonnance is boosted reiative to a
control condition of norma'l viewing (Freund, L972; Kurtz & Hov'lanc'
1953). If attempts are made to prevent verbal encoding during
viewing (by forcing a subiect to count backwards) subsequent
mefnory performance is reduced although not to chance level (Freund'
1972; Loftus, 1972). Both with photographs of natural scenes
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(Freund, lg72) and with nonsenseforms (Daniel , 1972), subiects who
generated verba'l labels for the p'ictures at the time of presenta-
tion perfonned more accurately on a subsequent recognition test
than subjects who did not label the pictures. Pezdek and Evans
(!SZS1 have argued that verbal labels only facilitate visual
memory performance when they provide effective discrimination
between otherwise complex multi-item st'inuli. when verbal labels
do not facilitate discrimination they may even impair recognition
accuracy.
The most compelling evidence against a separate code hypothe-
sis comes from experiments which have attempted to modify memory
for pictorial material by the introduction of subsequent verbal
material. In a series of studies, E.F. Loftus and her colleagues'
demonstrated that the introduction of misleading verbal information
fotlowing the presentation of a visual scene resulted in poorer
performance on a forced-choice recogn'ition test than did the
introduction of consistent or irrelevant information [Loftus, L975i
Loftus, lg77; Loftus, Miller & Burns, 1978; Gentner & Loftus,
1979). Pezdek (1977) and Rosenberg and Simon Oenl have sirnilarly
demonstrated 'cross-modal i ty i ntegrat'ion '.
The cross-rnodality studies are important because they offer a
mrre general kind of evidence that dichotomous approaches may be
quite misleading. Dichotomous models of memory have been generated
primarily by studies which have examined stimulus rnaterial in a
dichotomous manner. It seems like'ly, in the 'light of the cross-
rnodality studies that any dichotomy which does exist between
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rrpmory ior verbal and memry for pictorial material is not a
function of separate memory systems, but rather of the stimulus
material itself.
Sone theorists who have been concerned w'ith accounting for
the 'p'ictorial superiority' effect have concentrated on the prop-
erties of pictorial material rather than the processes involved
in its encoding. This emphas'is has taken them away from the
probably spurious verbal-visual dichotomy and provided a context
for describing memory for pictoria'l material without its necessar-
i1y being viewed as a d'istinct process from memory for verbal
materi al .
Nelson and his co'lleagues (Nelson & Reed, L976; Nelson'
Reed & McEvoy, L977; Nelson, Reed & Wal1ing, 1976) have attributed
the pictorial superiority effect to the fact that pictorial material
is more elaborate than verbal material and, therefore, more elabo-
rate sensory codes are likely to be formed during the processin9 of
pictoria'l materials. Several theorists have argued that pictures
are remembered better than words because they are more 'likely to
have a unique meaning (ol greater specificity) than words (Durso &
Johnson, 1979; Potter, Valian & Faulconer, L977; Snodgrass &
Vanderuart, 1980).
Jenkins, l.lald and Pittenger (1978) proposed an account of
pictorial superiority in terms of the semantic rather than featural
aspects of the stimulus material. They argued that in traditional
studies of memory for pictures the items are not related to each
other and each item, therefore, defines a separate event- In
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acquisition the subiect perceives a number of distinct events and
during the recognition test discrimination between old and new
items is made on the basis of events perceived or not perceived
rather than on the basis of the distinctive features of the
pi ctures.
The present writer argues that the impressive recognition
accuracy found in studies of memory for pictures is related to the
particular selection of acquisition stimuli and distractors. High
recognition scores may be due to the fact that the material seen
by subjects during acquisition has tended to be heterogeneous and
that distractors have been highly dissimilar with respect to
features.
l*'lany of the early experiments involved a selection of stimulus
material based on an intuitive notion of 'memorability'- Shepard
[1SOZ1, for instance, chose sets of p'ictures that were "'individually
of high salience and mernorabi'lity" and "collectively of low
similarity and confusabi1t'ty" (p. 157). Goldstein and Chance
(i970), on the other hand, presented sets of material which were
not chosen for theirindividual salience or collective simi'larity.
Three categories of pictures were shown to subiects - faces,
inkblots and snow-crystals. Accuracy on a later Y€cognition test
was 721" for facesr 51% for inkblots, and only 36% for snow-crystals.
The greater the homogeneity of the acquisition materia'|, the poorer
was memory perforrnance. Weaver and Stanny(1978), using colour
slides of outdoor scenes, found that the recognition of a single
picture increased with a reduction in the similarity of the
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acquisition stimulj. tihen subiects were asked to indicate "what
percentage of their responses was based on detai'is in the pictures
as opposed to a holistic analysis of the stimulus...subiects were
quite consistent in judging that detai'Ls were of greatest value"
(p. 61).
When variabi'lity within the acquisition set is reduced and
when distractors have many features in corrnon with acquisition
slides, recognition memory for pictures is less impressive. This
thesis, therefore, argues that the featural characteristics of
pictorial materia'l must be taken into account in any interpretation
of recognition performance for pictures.
Jenkins' Studies of Fusion
Jenkins, lllald and Pittenger (1978) examined recognition
merpry for pictorial s'lideS sequences. They adopted "an ecological
approach to the prob'lem" in which they regarded the "event as
primary" (p. 130).
l,,|e see events as natural wholes that are' so to speak'
percei ved tlwough the siides, rather than bui'lt up
from the slides. The slides are windows through
which the specifications of the event are glimpsed;
they are not Tinker Toys that are used to construct
some kind of event -'like edifice. (Jenkins et al ' ' L97B'
p. 158).
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They posed the following question:
If a subiect saw an approPriately ordered sequence of
pictures that was sufficient to give him all of the
necessary information for an event, would he give us
evidende that he had experienced that event in its
entirety? l'Iould heo for examplen falsely recognise
pictures of the event that he had not seen before?
Would he be able to reiect pictures that were highly
similar to the pictures he had seen but which
viotated some invariant of the event or some detail
of the observation? (JenkinS.:et o1., 1978' p. 137).
Three slide sequences of simple everyday events were used to
examine this question. Two sequences were designed to depict
clearly defined events in which there was a coherent progressive
action-sequence. An eighteen-s1ide sequence showed a woman making
a cup of tea and a.ten-slide sequence showed a teenage girl
answering the telephone. A third sequence in which ten slides
showed people at a party was thoug[t not to have a c]ear story
line. Subjects viewed the acquisition sequences twice and were
then given a standard recognition memory test in which they were
asked to discriminate between original slides and distractors.
There were two kinds of distractors. The first, called
'Belongi:ngs'o were part of the event depicted during acquisition.
The cornplete 'Te'lephone' sequence, for example, had consisted of
fourteen slides of which only ten were shown in acquisition, since
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every third s'lide in the complete sequence had been withdrawn
before presentation. The four slides which had not been shown in
acquisition were consistent with event and used as the Belonging
distractors. A second type of distractor, called 'Controls' were
inconsistent with the event depicted during acquisition. They
included either some change in the appearance of an actor in the
storyn or the overall perspective or composition of the scene was
altered. The complete recognition test material therefore consisted
of 0riginals, Belong'ings, and Controls. For the Tea sequence
the test series consisted of 8 0riginals, 8 Belongings' and 8
Controls. For the Telephone sequence there were four slides of
each test typen and the Party test material consisted of 4
0riginals, 5 Belongings, and 3 Controls.
It should be noted that this experiment is a very
strong test of our hypothesis. Our fundamenta'l
assumption is that if the pictures show an event
taking place over timeo the subjects will apprehend
the event. For our first test to work successfully
a further assertion is necessary, namelyr that having
apprehended the event, the subiect will be unable to
reject a p'icture that fits the speciftlcations of the
event he has experienced. This is in spite of the
fact that the two presentations in original learning
ought to ensure specific memory of the slides. Thus
we must argue that specific memory for individual
pictures will be outweighed by the abstract or
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general memory for the event experienced. At the same
time we shall argue that some aspects of remory will be
enhanced; specificallyn that any picture that violates
the constraints or invariants of the experienced event
wi'll be detected as new, no matter how much it
resembles the original pictures in terms of its
elements. (Jenkins et al . , 1978' p. i39).
The recognition perfonnance was as follows: with the Tea
series, 80% of Orig'ina1s were correctly accepted, 50% of Belongings
were falsely accepted and 10% of Controls were falsely accepted.
In the Telephone series there was 94% correct acceptance of
Qriginals, 42% false acceptance of Belongings and on'ly 3% false
acceptance of Controls. l,'lith the Party series , 83% of 0riginals
were correctly accepted and Belongings and Controls were falsely
accepted less than 10% of the time.
The recognition performance patterns depended on which
sequence was tested. l,,lhere the sequences depicted a clearly
defined evento subiects correctly accepted Originals but responded
to'the two types of distractors in different ways. They tended to
correctly reject Controls but falsely accept Belongings. However'
when the sequence did not depict a clearly defined event, as in the
case of the Party sequence , subjects not only coryect'ly accepted
the Originals, but also correctly reiected both types of distractor.
Jenkins argued that the. first type of response pattern (in
the Tea and Telephone sequences) was due to fusion. That iso
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subjects had learned the relationship between the individual slides
in the sequence and had perceived them as a coherent whole event
which was remembered better than the indiv'idual items of which it
consisted. He reasoned that in the case of the Party sequence'
where Belongings were correctly reiected, subiects had not "appre-
hended the event" in the first place and, therefore, had subse-
quently easily distinguished Originals from Belongings, since
Belongings did not actually belong to any defined event.
The robustness of the Jfusion effect'' was demonstrated in a
classroom sertting. Students were shown the Tea sequence twice at
the beginning of class and then 45 minutes later were given a
recognition test. This procedure was repeated on the next two
days. Subjects' performance remained the same over the course of
the three days. Belonging slides which were falsely accepted on
the first day were also false'ly accepted on the following two days'
despite the presentation material being shown twice each day.
When, in another similar experiment, the delay factor was removed
and testing inmediately followed presentat'iono the 'fusion effect'
persisted with the slight modification that Belongings which the
majority of students incorrectly iudged to be 0rig'inals' became
even more widely accepted over the three days, and Belongings which
had been correctly reiected became more widely detected. Jenkins
interpreted these findings as evidence that an event became better
specified w'ith repeated exposures.
-59-
Cri ti ci sm
It is argued here that the poor discrimination between
0riginals and Belongings compared to 0riginals and Controls in the
experiments described above, which Jenkins interpreted as evidence
for fusion, could also be accounted for in terms of confusion with
respect to featural detail.
Although it was claimed that both types of dt'stractors were
highly similar to 0riginals it is also the case that slt'des which
are withdrawn from a sequential related set [Belongings) are likely
to have more features in conmon with the remaining slides (0riginals)
than the Controls which not only do not com from the progressive
sequence, but which were made with some specific featural alteration
such as object perspective, or composition change. It is argued'
therefore, that not only are Belongtngs semantically consistent
with Orig'inals they are also featurally more similar than the
inconsistent Controls. The variah'les of semantic consistency and
featural similarity are thus confounded and it is possible that
Be:longings are falsely accepted not because they are consistent
with the perceived event, but because they are more similar to
Origina'ls than are Controls.
When the three sequences used considered in tenns of this
interpretation, the data may easily be accounted for by reference
to the features of individual slides. [,{ith the Party sequence,
where Belongings were correctly reiected, they were not drawn from
a progressive sequence and would not necessarily have more features
in conmon with 0riginals than did the Controls. In contrast, the
re
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Tea and Telephone Sequences were not only progressive but also,
these two sequences were photographed from a fixed stationary
point, which defined a constant frame for Originals and Belongings
(but not for Control s). The Party sequence was photographed from
different angles for al'l three types of slides-
A study by Baggett (1975) indicated that confusion with respect
to featural sirnilarity is an important factor in studies of memory
for sequential pictures. Subjects were shown four-frame cartoon
sequences and later asked to discriminate between origina'ls and
distractors which were either consistent or inconsistent with the
story. A'lthoughn when asked, subiects could identify distractors
wtrich were consistent, they d'id not falsely accept them in a
recognition test. In fact there were no false recognitions at all.
Baggett suggested that a possible reason for the lack of false
recogn'itions was that with the stimulus set used, each frame was
considerably different from any other with. respect to features and
that such gross featural differences could have enhanced discrimi-
nati on.
Jenkins attempted to dernonstrate that a featural-similarity
account of the findings was not appropriate. He argued that if a
set of 0riginals, which depicted an event when shown in a progressive
sequence, could be presented in such a way that the event was
"destroyed", then subiects would:ttat falsely accept Belongings if
false acceptance were indeed due to fusion. They would, however,
fa'lse1y accept Belongings if fa'lse acceptance were due to featural
simi I ari ty.
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Since the action-sequences depicted an event which took place
over time, Jenkins attempted to destroy the event by temporal
d'isorganisation. The slides in each set were now shown randomly
with respect to chronological order.
The results of this crucial test of fusion were not clear cut.
Disordered presentation affected recognit'ion performance differently
depending on which sequence was examined. There was no effect of
disordering the Party sequence, where subjects correctly rejected
Belongings. Jenkins observed that this result was to be expected
since there was no clearly defrlned event with the Party seguence
even when they were shown in a non-random order. The important
result centred on recognition performance given the two event
sequences. This is where disordered presentation should have
resulted in correct rejection of Belongings if their false accept-
ance under ordered conditions had been due to fusion. In the case
of the Telephone sequence, disordered presentation resulted in
corect rejection of both Belongings and Contro'ls. However, in the
case of the Tea sequence, even though the slfdes were presented in
a random order during acquisition, subjects' perforrnance did not
differ from the ordered condition - discrimfnation between 0riginals
and Belong'ings was much wonse than between 0riginals and Controls.
Jenkins argued that the effect of disordering on recognition
performance to the Tea seguence supported fusion and rejected an
interpretation of his data in terms of the featural properties of
the individual slides:
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0bviously similarirty hetween individual pictures could
not be the source of the false poslitives that were
originally observed for the Belonging slides in this
sequence. If the false positives had been due simply
to picture similarity, there is no reason for the
order of presentation to make any difference at all.
(Jenk'ins et al . , 1978, P. 143).
The contrany finding - that when the Tea sequence was disordered
there was no change in the high fa'lse acceptance of Belong'ings -
was attributed to the possibility that subiects had reordered the
sequence and therefore b.een able to fuse the event. In other words,
Jenkins argued that the tea seqnence was so well integrated as an
event that disordering did not destroy it.
Jenkins reported further studies of nnmory for visual events
with different stimulus material, from which he found support for
fusi.on. Hovrever, they are not discussed in any detail here since
those that tested the crucial variable of disordering did not find
the predicted effect ft(raft & Jenktns, L977; Pittenger & Jenkins'
1e7e).
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Introduction to the Present Experiments
A series of six experiments was conducted to examine and
extend Jenkin's studies of memory for everyday pictorial events.
At outseto the intention was to replicate the recognition perfonn-
6nqgr pattern observed by Jenkins and test the validity of a fusion
interpretation. It was hoped that confirmation of fusion would be
established and that his paradigm would provide a way of developing
a more explicit account of abstraction of pictorial events. However'
the experinents described in this thesis did not support fusion.
improvements were made both to the technical qual'ity of the
stimulus material and to the experimental procedure. Two types of
stimulus material were used in the present experiments. One type
consisted of six short action-sequences along the same lines as
those described by Jenkins. They were all of the same 'length, and
standardised wit}r respect to photographic conditions and construc-
tion. This material was used in the first two experiments where an
attempt was made to vary the degnee to which material could be
disordered. Six sequences allowed both for disordering individual
sequences whilst keeping the separate sequences distinctn and for
disordering between sequences as well as within. The second type
of stimulus material consisted of one long action-sequence
spec'ifically designed to be dt'fficult to reconstruct when disordered.
It became necessary to produce a sequence of th'is type in order to
establish whether subiects were able to reconstruct a particular
disordered sequence.
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Control slides (cal'led 'Transforrtrations' in the present
experiments) were produced in a way which systematically attempted
to maximize th.eir similarity to Origina'ls whilst transforming one
of four specified e'lements within the picture along the same l'ines
as lrlandler. They were photographed at points during the origina'l
sequence and were part of that overall progression of s'lides but
transformed in specific ways. Belongings were withdrawn from the
original sequences in the nnanner described by Jenkins, but in the
present experiments the proportions of test stimuli used by Jenkins
were applied exactlyn with one third Originals' one third Belong-
ings, and one third Transformations being presented in the
recognition test.
It was possible that Jenkinst results were specific to the
material he used, since his Belongings were always Belongings and
Originals were always Originals. Therefore, the present studies
used sampling procedures in which s'lides' from the action-sequences
served as Or'iginals and Belongings interchangeably. The r"rse of two
types of stimulus material - the short and long sequences - also
provided a more genera'l test of fusion.
A change in the analysis of the pr.esent studies concerned the
measure used to assess memory performance. Jenkins rel ied on a
direct comparison between false acceptance of Belongings and
Controls. In the present experiments performance was measured in
terms of relative discrimination between Belongings and Originals
and Transformations and 0riginals. Hit rates on 0riginals and
frlse alarm rates on distractors were converted into measures of d'.
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One d' value gave a measure of the subiects' ability to discriminate
betvleen 0riginals and Belongings (.d'0:B) and a second d'value gave
a measure of the subjects' ability to discriminate between Originals
and Transforma.tions [d'0:T). A compartson of the two measures
a'llowed assessment of differential performance, relatively free of
response bias. This use of dt as a measure of memory performance
is consistent with a number of studies of recognition memory
(-Connor, 1977; Franken & Rowland, 1978; Loftus & Bell, 1975;
Loftus & Loftus, 1976; Mandler & Ritchey, 1977; Pezdek, L977).
tn the present experiments, therefore, the effect which Jenkins
interpreted as evidence of fusion- i.e. false alarms on Belongings
bei.ng higher than false alarms on Controls and therefore closer to
hits on Originals - is i.dentified as present when d'Q:B is signifi-
cantly lower than d'0:T. In later experiments reaction times were
also rpasured in an attempt to obtain a more sensitive index of
recogni ti on performance.
The first experiment replicated Jenkins' findings that when
subiects are shown action-sequences which depict everyday events
and are then giyen a recognition test in which theo^e are two types
of distractors, d'0:B is significantly lower than d'0:T. An
attempt was made to repeat Jenkins' finding that when subiects see
the action€equences disordered during presentation they no longer
falsely accept Belongings. However, randomization of the temporal
order of slides in sequences did not affect recognition performance.
In the second experiment an alternative method was used to
test the fusion interpretation. Subiects were shown the action-
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sequences within an incidental learning situation, with two types
of orienting task. Some subiects were asked to perfonn a semant'ic
task during acquisition, whilst others performed a non-semantic
task. Since fusion depends on abstracting the meaning of a slide
sequence, semantic processing of acquist'tion material should
enhance fusion whereas non-semantic processing should impair the
process. It was, therefore, predicted that if the fusion hypothesis
is valid, d'0:B should be significantly lower than d'O:T fo1lowing
semantic.processing of acquisition material, but not following
non-semant'ic processing. This second experirnent also found no
support for the fusion interpretation, since non-semantic process-
ing within an incidenta'l learning paradigm did not attenuate
subiects.' tendency to fa'lsely accept Belonging, slides.
A third experirnent increased the retentfon period between
acquisition and testr'ng. Several studies have shown that the
semantic content of stimulus materrtal is retained for longer periods
than the structura'l content. It was therefore suggested that if
fusion is a main determiner of the reldtive d' values, then when
i.mpairment due to delayed testing becomes obviousn Transforrnations
should not be less accurately detected in a recognition test, since
they should be no iess inconsistent. Therefore impainnent would be
reflected in lowered d'0:B values. Conversely, if false acceptance
of Be'longings is primarily due to re]ative featural similarity'
then with a longer retention interva'|, discrimination of both
Belongings and Transformations should deteriorate - that is discrirn-
ination of the featural detaf'ls of both types of distractors should
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be impaired. Since there was no difference between distractors in
recognition performance after a longer retention interval, support
for fusion was not found
The fourth and fifth experiments returned to a more extensive
investigation of the effects of presentfng temporally disordered
material. Before any definr'tive test of the effect of disordering
material could be made, it now seemed essential to dernonstrate that
subjects who saw the sequence in a disordered version were not able
to reconstruct the underlying event. New stimu'lus material was'
therefore, made for the fjnal experiments. A long action-sequence
was designed in such a way that it would be difficult to reconstruct
when the slides were not in a temporarily ordered sequence. The
fourth experiment established that subiects who saw a disordered
Version of this sequence could not re-order it successfully. The
fifth experiment then examtlned the effect of disordering on recog-
nition memory performance. Despite careful selection of material
to ensure that disordering actually destroyed the event , and
despite the use of potentiaily more sensitive measures of recog-
nition performance, d'0:B was significantly lower than d'0:T
following Disordered Presentation.
The final experiment made a preli.minary attempt to find direct
evidence for the alternati've featural account of relative discrimi.-
nation of distractors. The aim of thl's experfment was to keep the
meaning of the distractor set consistent with the underlying event
presented in acquisition, whilst varying the degree of featural
similarity between 0riginals and distractors. Although the
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experiment was unsuccessful, it was suggested that if this rnethod
brere used with material specifically destgned for this purpose it
might pttvide a means of studying recognltton nemory for pictorial
events wtrere a more expticit dtsttnctton could be made tn the test
materrial between featural similarity and meaning.
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EXPERIMENT I
Introduction
The main aim of the first experirent was to replicate the
finding reported by Jenkins et al. (1978) that subiects falsely
accept a significantly greater number of Belonging slides than
Transformation siides on a recognition test following the present-
ationofa'idctorial sequence which depicts an event. This is the
specific response pattern from which Jenkins has inferred the
process of fusion in his experiments. In the present research this
response is defined in terms of d' scores and is present when d'0:T
(the discrimination between Originals and Transformations) is
significantly greater than d'0:B (the discrimination between
0r'iginals and Belongings).
A further aim of the first experirnnt was to test the fusion
account by presenting some subiects with disorder€d acquisition
sequences. In one experiment described in the Jenkins et a't'(1g78)
paper, the individual slides which made up a sequence $rere shown
to subjects in a random order during acquisition. Jenktns had
argued that if disordering destroyed the event then fusion would
not occur and subiects would coryectly reiect BelonginEs. 0n
the other hand if a tendency to falsely accept Belongings were
caused by Belongings hav'ing more features in connon with Originals
than had Transformat'ions, then disordering the sequence would have
no effect. That is, despite disordering, subiects would still
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falsely accept Belongings,
The result of Jenkins' test was ambiguous. When presentation
was disordered, subiects falsely accepted the Belongings of one of
his two sequences but correctly reiected the Belongings of the
other sequence. Although Jenkins acknowledged that "the similarity
problem is a critical one and cannot be Oismissed by the results of
one experiment" (1978, p. 161)' he argued strongly in favour of the
fusion hypothesis.
According to Jenkins, if fusion is responsible for recognition
rcmory performance of pictorial events, disordered presentation of
.an event sequence should increase d'O:B so that there is no signif-
icant difference between d'0:B and d'0:T. In the present experimentn
the effect of disorder was examined at two levels by showing six
slide sequences in two different ways. In a bisordered-Within'
condition, the individual slides within each sequence were disordered
but the Sequences were kept distinct from one another. A greater
degree of disordering was used in a 'Disordered-l^lithin-and-Between'
condition, where all the slides were d'isordered; that is not on'ly
were the individual slides within a sequence disordered but also
the sequences themselves were mixed together.
The Disordered-Within condition manipulated order to the sare
extent as in the Jenkins experiment which found support for the
fusion hypothesis. The Disordered-Within-and-Between condit'ion was
introduced as an additional disordering manipulation in an attempt
to ensure that subjects could not re-order the disordered material.
The fusion hypothesis would be supported by smaller dt0:B
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than d'0:T values in the 0rdered condition along with no difference
betneen the d' measures for the Disordered conditions. That is'
the fusion hypothesis predicts an interaction between the variables
of st'imulus type and degree of ordering. An interaction would be
absent if confusion of stimulus features !€re responsible for the
d'0:B versus d'0:T difference.
Method
Subjects were 16 womn and eight nren. Tneir ages ranged from
17 to 42 years with a mean age of 22.75 and a standard deviation of
7.10. The design was a 3 (Qrdered versus Disordered-Within versus
Disordered-ttithin-and-Betneen) X 2 (Belonging versus Transformation)
factorial with repeated measures on the second factor. Eight
subjects were randomly assigned to each of the three groups.
Subjects took part in the experiment individually and al'l instruc-
tions were written.
Stimulus Materials
A Nikkormat camera fitted with an F2 50mn lens ano ultra violet
filter was used to make six sets of slides. The camera was set on a
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tripod so that each of the six sets of slides was taken from a
fixed stationary point. Some sequences were taken by natural 'light
whilst for others it was necessary to use electronic flash lighting.
Kodachrome ASA 64 film was used throughout.
Each set consisted of 20 slides, 16 of which depicted an
action-sequence in a consistent and progressive ranner and four of
which changed some aspect of the sequence according to a rule.
Each action-sequence was a distinct activity perforued by one
person. The activities were as follows: (a) a woman paying a bi'l l;
(b) a woman ironing a tablecloth; (c) a woman hanging out washing;
(d) a man making a sandwich; (e) a man chopping firewood; (f) a
man lighting a fire. An example of one of the sets of 20 slides is
shown in Figure 1..
Before photographing each activity, it was rehearsed by the
actor and timed. The real-time duration of activities varied
between B0 and 120 seconds. When the duration of an activ'ity had
been established, the time was divided by 16 so that each of the 16
photographs depicting the activity could be taken on cue at equal
interva'ls throughout the action. Thus, depending on the duration
of the activity, a photograph was taken every rfive, six, or seven
seconds. In this way, six sets of 16-frame sequences were made,
each one depict'ing an every-day activity.
The four Transformation slides changed some aspect of the
activity so that although each was similar to the 16 slides which
depicted the activity, it differed from them according to a specific
rule. For each action-sequence, one Transfonnation slide was made
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Fiqure l: A short set of slides
Originsls (Ordered-Presenfcltion l
BelonginEs
Addifion Token Perspecfive Orientcrtion
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according to each of these four rules; (a) Addition: An obiect
which might reasonably appear in such a setting but which had not
been included was added. For example, a hearth-brush was added to
the ''man lighting a fire' sequence. (b) Toren: Some change was
made in the appearance of the actor. For example, the 'man making
a sandwich' wore glasses. (c) Perspective: A wide-angle lens
(FZ 28nm) was substituted for the F2 50nm lens. (d) 0rientation:
A duplicate of one of the 16 slides was made and reversed with
respect to left-right orientation. In photographing the scenes'
the four Transformation s'lides were spaced at approximately equal
intervals over the course of the whole activity. Addition, Token,
and Perspective slides were made at the same time as the L6 slides
depicting the activity. The action was rfrozenq at the appropriate
moment, the change made, the photograph taken, and then the
original scene was restored.
Apparatus
Slides were proiected onto a white wall by means of two Kodak
Carousel SAV 2000 proiectors which operated in direct succession.
The projected image was .45 x .69m both for acquisition and test
stimuli, and subiects sat approximately 1.5m from the screen. Each
slide was shown for 5 seconds and there was no interstimulus
interval. Exposure durat'ion was determined by Gerbands tachtlsto-
scopic shutters mounted in front of the proiector lenses. Shutter
operation was timed by standard relay and electronic programming
apparatus.
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Procedure
Eight randomly detennined orders of the six sets of slides were
generated. The first subiect in each condition saw one of these
orders, the second subJect saw another, and so on. Four groups of
evenly spaced Belongings could be withdrawn from any sequence of 16
slides depicting an act'ivity: that is slide numbers 1,5' 9, 13;
2, 6, 1.0, 14; 3, 7 n 11, 15; or 4, 8, L2, 16. The group of
Belongings withdrawn from a sequence was determined randomly for
each of the six sequences seen by the first subiect in each
condition, and then again for each of the six sequences seen by the
second subject in each condition, and so on. The remaining 1.2
Orig'inal slides were shotln during acquisition. Four of these were
selected at random to be shown during testing. All first subiects
in each condition were shown the same Original slides during test-
ing, as were second subjects, and so on. In this wa;1, eight
different selections of 72 slides were presented during acquisition'
one for each of the eight subiects within each group.
Subjects in the Ordered condition saw the slides within each
sequence in their correct chronological order". Subiects in the
Disordered-Within condition were presented with randomly ordered
slides within each sequence but the. sequences were showfl SUCCQSS-
ively. Subjects in the Disordered-Within-and-Between condition
all 72 slides completely randomized across all six sequences of
sl i des.
The test material consisted of four Originals, four Belongings
and four Transformations frsn each of the six slide sets. The
saw
t2
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order of these 72 test slides was deterlnined randomly with no dis-
tinction being made between the sets. An order was generated for
al'l first subiects in each condition, anothel' order was generated
for all second subiects' and so on.
In the acquisition phase of the experiment subiects were told
that they were taking part in a memory experiment and were asked to
try to remember the slides which were about to be shown to them.
The 72 acquisition slides were then presented. Three minutes after
the end of the acquisition phase' all subiects were tested in the
same way. During the interval bebreen the end of the acquisl'tion
phase and the start of testing, they read the test instructions and
were examined in their understanding of them. Subiects were then
required to view the test slides and comp'lete a form by assigning
a number from L to 4 for each slide indicating how certain they
were that they had or had not seen that slide before. "1" meant
"I am certain that I have Seen thiS S'lide befOret', "2" meant "I am
fair'ly sure that I have seen this slide bef,Orer', "3" meant I'I am
fairly sure that I have not seen this slide before"n and r'4" meant
"I am certain that I have not seen this slide before". Subjects
were not told about the prior probabilities of the target and
distractor slides.
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bsul ts
Confidence rating data were collapsed into "Yes" and "No"
responses, where l and 2 indicated "Yes" and 3 and 4 indicated "N0".
The mean (and standard deviation) Hit and False Alarm rates are
given in Table 1. Hit rates for the 0riginals and Fa'lse Alarm rates
for Belongings and Transfonnations were converted into d' scores
for each subject from tables in Green and Swets (1966). The mean
(and standard deviation) d' scores for each type of distractor and
for the three kinds of presentation condition are given in Table 2.
An AN0VAa which examined Presentation Type (between-subiect)
and Distractor Type (within-subject) showed no effect of Presentation'
but a strong effect of Distractor, I (1,21) = 35.18' MSe = .11,
p < .001. with d,0:T higher than d'Q:B. There was no interaction.
Di scussion
The main effect reported by
cated - d'01:T was significantlY
response pattern was present in
Jenkins et al. (1978) was repli-
higher than d'0:8. However, this
both Ordered and Disordered
h Appendix A presents surrnary tables of all ANOVAS reported in the
thesis.
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TABLE 1
Mean (and standard deviation'l Hit and False Alarm proportions for
Originals, Belongings, and Transfonnations for Ordered, Disordered-
l^lithin, Disorde!"ed-lillithin-and-Between pre
Presentation TyPe Test Slide Type
0r'igi na'l Bel ongi ng Transformati on
0rdered .76(.11) .51(.13)
.29
( .11)
Di sordered-Wi thi n .84
( .10)
.58
( .13)
.30(.0e)
Di sordered-Wi thi n
and-Betneen
.79(.11) .43( .13)
.30(.0e)
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TABLE 2
l',lean (and standard deviation) d' scores for Originals to
0;B) and 0risinals to Tf@
for Ordened, Di sordered-U:ilhg Di sordered-Wi thi n-and-Between
presentati on condi ti ons
Presentation TyPe Distractor Type
0:B 0:T
.73(.38) 1.35(.68)
.85(.40) 1.59(.43)
t.a2
( .35)
t.37(.46)
Di sordered.tdithin
Di sordered-Wi thi n
and-Between
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conditions. The interaction between presentation condrltions and
relative d' measures predicted by a fusion hypothesis was not
present and the results of this experiment did not therefore support
fusi on.
The more general question of the effect of order on memory is
pertinent to the present result. 0n the whole, it has been shown
that when organised material is presented to subiects, it is
remembered more accurately than when it is presented in dn una(fdn-
ised fashion. Improvement in memory performance has been demon-
strated with associative organisation (Jenkins & Russell ' I952i
Bower, tg7?), category organisation (Bousefield, Cohen & Whitnarsh,
1g58; Cofer, Bruce & Reicher, 1966)r drd subiective organisation
(Mandler, t972; Tulving, 1962). The effect of organisation on
rrpmory has been demonstrated more clear'ly with recall than recog-
nition performance and has been tested most extensively with verbal
material (Kintsch, lg74). Studies which have shown impairrnent in
perception and recognition of pictorial material have manipulated
spatial order (Biedermann 1972; Biederman, Glass & Stacyn 1973;
Bidderman, Rabinowitz, Glass & Stacy, 1974; Mandler & Johnson'
1976; Mandler & Parker, 1976; Mand'ler & Ritchey' tr977) '
The present experiment manipulated temporal order and indicated
that temporal disordering of pictorial sequences-does not impair
recognition performance. It remains possible, however, that the
manipulation of temporal order was ineffective simp'ly because
subjects in the disordered conditions spontaneously re-organised
the material. Specifically, it may be the case that the slide
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Sequences used in the present study depicted events so we]l speci-
fied by the individual slides that subiects were able to reconstruct
the underly'ing events.
Three subsequent findings indicated that it was unl'ikely that
order was ineffective because of subjective reorganisation. Firstly'
a post-hoc comparison was made between the 0rdered Presentation and
the more extremely disorganised condition - the Disordered-Within-
and-Between Presentation. An AI'|0VA showed that d'0;T was signifi-
cantly higher than d'O:B (E, (1,21) = 31, MSe = .07, P. < .001) but
there was no effect of presentation and no interaction.
Secondly, the next experiment in this series demonstrated that
disordering was not only perceived by subiects but that the intended
degrees of disordering were perceived as significantly different.
Thirdly, later expepiments in this series explicitly investi-
gated the problem of subiective reorganisation and showed that
reconstruction of disorganised material is unlikely to be responsible
for the absence of an order effect.
It is morelikely that the type of information which detennined
recognition performance was not affected by disordering. In her
examination of the effect of disordering on recognition of
pictorial material Mandler found that although merory for spatial
relationships between obiects was impaired by disorganisation'
merpry for specific obiect information was not affected (Mandler &
Parker, 1976; Mandler & Ritchey, L977). Mandler's results point to
the possibi.lity that specific slide information was the main deter-
miner of recognition accuracy in the present experiment.
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EXPERIMENT II
Introduction
The second experiment tested the fusion hypothesis by examin-
ing performance within an incidental rather than intentional learn*
ing paradigm. In this way, acquisition task conditions could be
manipulated directly. For fusion to occur' subiects must process
material semantically. If this is made djfficu'lt by requiring them
to perform a non-semantic task with the material during acquisition'
then fusion should be impaired. conversely, if subiects are encou-
raged to engage in semantic processing during acquisition, particu-
lar'ly in processing which emphasises the sequential nature of the
event depicted by the material, then fusion should be facilitated.
Srrbiects in a Semantic condition were given an orienting task
spec.ifical'ly related to the thematic coherence of the tota'l acqui-
sit.ion set - they were required to iudge the logical relationsh'ip
between each slide. subiects in a tion-semantic condition were
required to concentrate on a gross global feature of each slide -
they were required to iudge the relative brightness of each slide
during acquisition.
The fusion hypothesis would be supported if d'0:T were sign'if'
icantly higher than d'0:B in the Sernantic condition a'long with no
significant difference between d'0;T and d'0;B in the Non-semantic
condition. 0n the other hand, if d'0:T were s'ignificantly higher
than d'0:B along w'ith no interaction between the relative d' values
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and the acquisition task conditions, then the results would indicate
that fa'lse acceptance of Belongings was due primarily to their
featural similarity to Originals.
It was predicted that the overall d' values would be higher for
the Semantic group compared to the Non-Semantic group since subiects
who perfonn semantic orienting tasks during acquisition tend to give
evidence of more accurate and more durable memory than subiects who
perfonn rcn-semantic orienting tasks (Craik & Lockhart, 1972).
$rder was varied again in the second experinent with the
intention of discovering whether subjects pete-etoedthe different
degrees of di sordering intended by the arbitrary manipulation of
stimulus material during presentation. The acquisition data from
subjects in the Semantic group who were required to iudge the
logical progression of the material in the three conditions were
used to assess subiects' perception of order. If the three differ-
ent types of presentation represented varying degrees of order then
the total number Of "No" responses made to the question "Does this
slide follow on logically from the previous slide?" should vary
accordi ngly.
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Method
Subiecls
Subjects were 23 women and 25 men. Their ages ranged from 16
to 36 years with a mean of 20.96 and a standard deviation of 4.09'
The design was a 2 (Semantic versus Non-semantic) X 3 (Ordered
versus Disordered-Within versus Disordered-Within-and-Between) X 2
(Belonging versus Transformation) factoria'l with repeated measures
on the last factor. Eight subiects were randomly assigned to each
of the 6 between-subiect groups. Subiects took part in the experi-
ment individually, and a'll instructions were written.
Procedure
The procedure and stimuli were the sanre as in Experiment i.
except that subiects were told that they were taking part in a
perception experiment. Subiects in the Semantic condition were
asked to judge the logical progression in the acquisition s'lides.
They had to complete a form during presentation by marking "Yes"
or "No" for the question "Does this slide follor on logically from
the previous sjide?" for every s'lide except the first. Subiects
'in the Non-Semantic condition were asked to judge the relative
brightness levels of the slides. They had tocompletea similar form
by marking "Yes,,or "No" for the question "Is this slide brighter
than the previous slide?" for every slide except the first. No
mention was made of the memorY
phase had been completed, when
nition test instructions as in
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test until after the
subjects were given
Experiment I.
acqui si tion
the same recog-
Resul ts
Confidence rating data from the test phase of the experiment
were co'llapsed intO "Yes" and "No" responses Where 1 and 2 indiCated
',yes,r and 3 and 4 indicated 'rNorr. The mean (and standard deviation)
Hit and False Alarm rates are presented in Table 3. The d' values
ca'lculated from the Hit and False Alarm rates are given in Table 4.
An ANOVA which examined Presentation Type (between-subiect),
Task Type (between-subiect) and Distractor Type (within-subiect)
showed no effect of Presentation but a reliable effect of Task'
F (1,42) = 1.1.34, MSe = .32, P < .01.' and a strong effect of
Distractor, I (I,42) = L37.14, MSe = .07, P< .001. No interactions
were significant. Subiects in the Senrantic grgup performed signif-
icantly better than subiects l:n the Non-semantic group, but there
was no significant difference between the groups with respect to
distractors. For both the Semantic aroup and the Non-Semantic
group d'0:T was significantly higher than d'0:B.
Acquisition data from the Semant'ic aroup were examined since
the number o_f "No" responses to the question "Does this s'lfde follow
on]ogically from the previous slide?!'gives .t measure of the
perceived degree of logical order in the acquisition slides where
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TABLE 3
Mean (and standard deviation) Hit and False Alarm proportions for
originals, Bel.ongings. and Transformations for 0rdered, Disordered-
hlithin, and Disordene{-Wi,thin-and-Between presentation conditions
and for Semantic and Non-Semantic tasks
Presentati on
Type Task Type
Test S'lide Type
Original Belonging Transformation
0rdered Semanti c .84(. tz) .57(.12)
.38(.09)
Non-Semantic .65( 
.21)
.56
( .21)
.33(.17)
Di sordered-
l,li thi n
Semantic .81
(.. 11)
60
( .13)
.37(.10)
Non-Semanti c .59(.15) .55( .17)
.26(.tt1
Di sordered-
}.li thi n-and-
Between
Semantic .7L
t. 17)
.61(. 13)
.37(.10)
Non-Semanti c .55
( .1e)
.48(.i7) .30(.14)
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TABLE 4
Belonoinqs (0:B) and Orioinals to Transformations (0:T'l foq
0rdered, Di sordered-Within, and Di sordered-Within-and-Between
scores for 0rigina!-lq
tation conditions and for Semantic and Non-semantic tasks
Presentati on
Type Task Type
Distractor TyPe
0:T0:B
0rdened Semanti c .93(.64) L.421.51)
Non-Semantic .19(.48)
.98(.42)
Di sordered-
t.li thi n
Semanti c .68(.2e) 1"25( .33)
Non-Semanti c .13( .3e)
.94(.48)
Di sordered-
b{i thi n-and-
Between
Semanti c .32(.23) .95(.44)
Non-Semanti c .24(.43) .74(.51)
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a small number would indicate a high degree of order. The mean
frequencies (and standard deviation) of "No" responses were 10.75
(5,85) for the Ordered condition5', 34.13 (7.57) for the Disordered-
Illithin condition, and 55.38 (6.41) for the Disordered-l^lithin-and-
Between group. An AN0VA which examined Presentation Type (between-
subject) shorcd an effect of Presentation, L Q,ZL) = 123.93,
MSe = 37.52, p < .001. A scheff{ test showed that perceived
orderliness increased systematically over the three presentation
types (al1 gs < .001).
Di scussi on
The results of this experiment did not support the fusion
hypothesis. Although the Semantic groups' perfomance was sig-
nificantly more accurate than the Non-semantic Aroups', and
although the Semantic groups' d'0:B scores were significantly Iower
than thei.rn d'0:T scores, the crucial interaction predicted by a
fusion hypothesis was not present. Despite a feature-specific
orienting task, the Non-Semantic groups' d'0:B scores were aiso
the Ordered condition at least five "No's would be expected
that six distinct sequences were shown.
u In
gi ven
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significant'ly lower than their d'0:T scores, and the degree of
their differential discrimination of distractors was as great as
that of the Semantic ArouP.
The finding that the Semantic aroups' overall recognition
performance was better than that of the Non-semantic group is
consistent with the general finding of the "levels-of-processing"
research. Although the early description of depth of processing
has been modified (Craik & Tutving, 1975), the distinction between
non-s,emantic and s.emantic processing has f'lourished in the
literature. Few experimenters have questioned the validity of
such a distinction, although as several researcherS have observed
(Baddeley, L978i D'Agostino, 0'Nejl1 & Paivio, L977; Nelson'
L977; Nelson & Vining, 1978; Postman, L975; Wolk, 1974), the
distinction lacks precision and the representative tasks depend on
individual and intuitive interpretations of these types of
processing.
However, the effect of differential encoding on memory
perfonnance has been demonstrated under a variety of experimental
conditions. Semantic processing has been shown to resuit in better
memory than non-semantic processing of nouns [schulman, 1971),
sentences (Rosenberg & Schiller, 1971), and faces ("Bower & Karlin'
1974). The effect has been observed within both incidental (Hyde &
Jenkins, 1973), and intentional (.Treisman & Tuxworth, 1974) learning
paradigms, and where memory has been assessed by free recall
(lvlarslen-Wilson & Tyler, 1976), cued recali [Bobrow & Bower, 1969)'
and recognition (Arbuckle & Katz, 1976).
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Various tasks designed to evoke semantic processing have been
used. These include iudging the stimuli for pleasantness (Hyde &
Jenkins, 1973), fami'liarity (Rosenberg & Schiller, 1971), reaning-
fulness (Mistler-Lachman" Lg74), suitability (craik & Tulving, 1975)'
and contextual appropriateness (Mistler-Lachman, L974). Similarly'
a variety of non-semantic tasks have been devised and include
estimating the number of 'e''s in a word (Hyde & Jenkins, 1973)'
crossing out vowel;s (Tresselt & Mayzner, 1960), and noting the case
of a word (Craik, 1973).
The present experiment extended the levels-of-processing
research by showing that a task which required subiects to iudge
the log.ical relationship between complex pictorial stimuli resu'lted
in more accurate recognition performance than a task which required
subjects to iudge a physical relationship between stimuli.
The absence of any effect of order was relevant to this
finding. Not only has it been shown that semantic tasks result in
more accurate memory than non-semantic tasks, but it has a]so been
shown that the differential encoding effect is sensitive to
different degr.ees (or lclepths') of semantic processing (Craik' 1973;
Klein & Sal tz, t976; Mistler-Lachman, 1974). Moreover the effect
has been demonstrated more directly by varying the degree to which
stimul i eafl be processed (l*larslen-lrlilson & Tyler, 1976)- It was
puzzling, therefore, to find that disorganisation of the logical
relationships between slides did not appear to aFfect the performance
of the Semantic group whose task was des'igned to elic'it logicai
processing.
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Acquisition data from the Semantic aroup_had shown that the
manipulation of chronological order was perceived by subiects.
Moreover the manipulation systematically changed degrees of
disordering. It might, therefore, be expected that the degree to
which the material eoulfi, be processed semantically would have been
apparent in the Semantic groups' performance. Conversely, given
the absence of an order effect in Experiment I, and g'iven the
featural emphasis of the non-semantic task, disordering would not
have been expected to affect the Non-Semantic Eroups.
The interaction relevant to this question (Presentation X
Task) in the main AN0VA was not significant. Hori,rever, it was
decided to make two separate post-hoc examinations of the effect
of order. An ANQVA which examined d' scores for the Semantic 9r0up
alone, found an effect of Presentation F, (2,21) = 3-55' l4Se = .33,
g < .05 and DistractoF, l, (1,21) = 96.25, MSe = .04, p < .001,
there was no interaction. A subsequent Scheffd test showed that
the 0rdered Presentation group's performance was significantly
better than the Disordered-l^lithin-and-Between Presentation groups'
performanc€r P < .001. An ANQVA which examined the d' scores for
the Non-semantic grouP alonen found an effect of Distractor, F,
(L,zL) = 58.60, MSe = .10, p < .001, but no effect of order and no
i nteract'i on.
These separate analyses revealed that disordering acquisition
material affected recognition accuracy in the Semantic group but
did not affect performance in the Non-Semantic group. Although
this finding is not a strong one, it is consistent with the
literature which has shown that semantic encoding effects are
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sensitive to the degree to which material can be processed semantic-
al'ly. Moreover, with respect to the question of the effects of
terporal disorganisation of pictorial sequences, the find'ings show
that when an acquisition task specifically directs subiects'
attention to the chronolog'ical relationships between slides, order
is an effective variable. However, since it is ineffective when
the task is unrelated to chronological order (the t'lon-Semantic
group) and since it is ineffective in the context of an intentional
remembering conditjon (Experiment I), it seems unlikely that
apprehension of the logical relationship between individual slides
in a pictorial sequence (or fusion) is the primary determinant of
recognition memorY.
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EXPERIMENT III
Introducti on
The thi'rd experiment tested fusion by varying the retention
interval between acquisition and test. Not only has the maiorityof
research investigating duration of memory shown that perfonnance
deteriorated over tire, but more specifically, severa'l studies
have revealed differential rates of decay for the deep and surface
structure of the material.
Although some studies suggest that long-term retention of the
featural detai'ls of verbal material is greater than has been
comnonly thought, (Bates, Masling & Kintsch' 1978; Keenan,
Mct^lhinney & Mayhew, L977; Kintsch & Bates, 1977 ), there is
considerable evidence that the decay rate of the surface structure
of sentences is faster than the decay rate of the semantic
structure (Anderson, L974i Bartlett, 1932; Graesser & Mandler,
1975; Kintsch, t974', K'intsch & Keenan, 1973i M'istler-Lachman,
L974; Sachs , L967, L974).
Several researchers have argued that pictorial matenial has
equivalent surface and deep structures (Craik & Lockhart, L972;
Nelson, Reed & McEvoy, 1977; Rafnel & Klatzky, 1978), which appear
to have similarly differential decay rates. Memory for p'ictorial
material is more accurate when the stimulus elements are presented
in a meaningful context as opposed to no context or a meaningless
context (Bower, 1970; Epsteiin, Rock & Zuckerman, 1960; Mandler &
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Ritchey, t977; Paris & Mahoney, 1974; Posner & Keele' 1970).
Furthermore, it has been shown that memory for pictures which are
meaningful as opposed to arnbiguous or nonsensical is more durable
(Baggett, 1975; Bower, Karlin & Dueck, t975; Klatzky & Rafnel,
1976; Rafnel & Klatzky, 1978).
The general principle which emerges from thtis research is th.at
npmory for the gist of stimulus material is more durable than
memory for the details. This princip'le suggested a way of testing
the fusion hypothesis. If mennry were impaired by increasing the
retention interval, then it could be assumed that the impainnent
would be due primarily to a loss of memory for the details of the
material. That is, at the point at which performance became sig-
nificantly worse in delayed testing, subiects would be responding
predominantly on the basis of their memory for the event. And the
nature of the impainnent could be used specifically to examine
JenkiN' argurcnt that at inrnediate test'ing a lower d'0:B than
d'0:T was due to fusion.
If fusion is responsible for the difference in the relative
d' values at jnrnediate testing, then when recognition memory is
impaired by delay, the impa'irment should not be reflected in a
lowered d' 0:T value, since there is no reason to assume that
Transformations wou'ld become any Less incons'istent with the event.
Therefore, nemory.impairment should be due primari'ly to a lowered
d'0:B value. 0n the other hand, if the difference between d'Q:B
and d'0:T at immediate testing is attributable to the relative
featural similarity between distractor types and Originals, then
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when recognition memory is impaired by delay, the impairment should
be reflected in a lowered d' value for both types of distractors,
since memory for the featural detai'l of both Transformations and
Belongings should be equally affected by delay. Three retention
intervals were used to examine the fusion hypothesis in this way:
inmediate testing' and delays of 24' hours and one week.
Method
Subjects
Subjects were 22 women and 26 men. Their .ages ranged from 16
to 41 years with a mean age of 23.78 and a standard deviation of
6.55. The des'ign was a 3 (Inrnediate versus 24 Hours versus One
Week delay) X 2 (Belonging versus Transformation) factorial with
repeated measures on the second factor. Sixteen subiects were
randomly assigned to each of the three groups. Subjects took part
in the experiments individually, and a'l'l instructions were written.
Procedure
The procedure and stimuli were
except for the fo1'lowing changes:
during acquisition; slides were
the same as
only ordered
in Experiment I,
sequences were shown
seconds each duringshown for four
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acquisition; and subiects were asked only to indicate f'Yes" or uNo"
during testing to the question "Have you seen this slide befor.?:"'
Retention interval was now varied so that subiects in the delayed
conditions returned either 24 hours or one week later for the test
phase.
Resul ts
The mean (and standard deviation) Hit and False Alarm rates
for each retention interval are shown in Table 5. The d' values
calculated from these are given in Table 6.
An ANQVA which examined Retention Interval [between-subiect)
and Distractor Type (within-subiect), showed a reliable effect of
Retention, F (2,45) = 3.36, MSe = .39, g < .05, and a strong effect
of Distractor, F (1,45) = 19.92, MSe = .49, E < .001, with d'0:T
higher than d'0;8. There was no interaction. Subsequent Scheff6
tests showed that performance was less accurate after a retention
interval of one week than after 24 hours h < .01) or on innediate
testing (!.< .025). There was no significant difference in recog-
nition performance between imrnediate or Z4-hour delayed testing.
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TABLE 5
lrlean (and standard deviation) Hit and False Alarm proportions for
0riqinals, Belongings, and Transformations for Irmediate, 24 Hours
and One Week retention interval!
Retention Interval Test Slide TyPe
Ori g'inal Belonging Transformation
Inrnedi ate .77(.11) .59(.0e) .32( .12)
24 Hours .81(.14) .63(. t+1
.38(.10)
.77(.0e) .67( .13)
.44(.17)
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TABLE 6
Belongings (0:B) and 0riginals to Transformations (0:T'l for
lGan (and standard deviation) dr scores for 0riginals to
Inmdiate. 24 Hours, and One Week retentiollinterva'ls
Retention Interval Distractor Type
0:T0:B
Inmedi ate .59(.44) t.25(.64)
.62(.471 L.26(.47)
.27(.3e) .89(.s2)
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Di scuss ion
There was a significant impairment in recognition performance
after a delay of one week, hut no deterioration after a de'lay of
24 hours. ltienrory for complex photographic slide sequences appears
to be stable over the course of at 'least one day, but has deterio*
rated after a week. This finding is consistent with studies which
have examined the effects of retention interval on menory for
pictorial line drawings (Baggett, 1975; Mandler & Ritchey, 1977).
Although performance was significantly impaired after a week, the
difference between d'0:B and d'0;T was virtually identical for all
three conditions: [d'0:T - d'O;B -.66 for Inmediate, '64 for
24-Hour delay, .62 for. 0ne"Week delay). Since impairment over time
was reflected 'in both distractor discriminat'ion values, this
experiment did not support the argument that fusion is responsible
for the lower d'Q:B relative tO d'0lT'at Imnediate testing,
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EXPERIMENT IV
i ntroduction
The fourth experiment returned to the question of the effect
of disordering material during presentation. In the first experi*
ment in this series, the difference between d'0:B and d'0:T measures
for subjects who viewed the disordered sequences was no different
from that for subiects who viewed ordered sequences. The absence
of this interaction between stimulus type and order, also apparent
in the second experimento was interpreted as a serious failure to
find support for the fusion hypothesis. However, a criticism of
this test of fusion is that subiects may reconstruct the original
event from the disordered sequence. Indeed, when disordering has
not demohstrated fusion in previous studies, this argument has been
offered consistently (Kraft & Jenkins, L977i Jenkins et al.' l'978;
Pittenger & Jenkins, 1979).
For storied'presented verbally, Baker (1978) found no evidence
that subjects reconstructed story order when shown disordered
stories, a'lthough the maiority of research has indicated that
subjects are likely to re-order stories into their natural
schematic order (Bower, Black & Turner, 1979; Kintschn Mandel &
Kozminsky, t977- Mandler, 1978; Stein & Glenn' 197B). Therefore'
the primary aim of the fourth experiment was to challenge the re-
ordering criticism directly by producing a pictorial action-
sequence which could not be re-ordered. A test of the fusion
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hypothesis via disordering could therefore be made with greater
confi dence.
New material was produced for this experiment. A long slide
sequence was specifically devised to make successful reconstruction
of the disordered story unlikely. The stimulus set, whose story
was a series of encounters between men and women which resulted in
new friendships, is shown in Figure 2. The exact order of the
encounters between individuals was crucial to an understanding of
the story. The intention was to ensure that the presence of any
two people in a slide seen out of its rtemporal context was devoid
of the implication of their connection - a factor crucial to the
meaning of the story.
The first phase of the experiment atternpted to establish
whether subjects who saw the acquisition slides in a random order
were ahle to reconstruct the underlying story. Two experimental
groups - Qrdered Presentation and Disordered.Presentation were
asked to write iin account of the story contained in the set of
slides they saw. The Disordered.Presentation group were specific-
al'ly asked to attempt to reconstruct the story. These accounts
were later assessed by independent judges who had seen the ordered
Sequence. They were rank-ordered and rated for their closeness to
the actual story depicted by the ordered version.
The subjects were also given the standard recognition test
after writing their accounts. In this experiment the recognition
test not only recorded subiects' decisions about test slides but
also their reaction times for those decisions. This additional
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Figurp 2: The lons set of slides
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mbasure of performance was introduced since it seemed possible that
reaction time miEht provide a more sensitjve measure of recognition
performance.
Method
Sub-iects
subjects were 16 women and..eight rnen.' Their ages ranged
from 1.7 to 29 years with a mean age of 1.9.25 and a standard
deviation of ?.69. The design was a 2 (Ordered versus Disordered)
X 2 (Belonging versus Transformation) factoria'l with repeated
measures on the second factor. Twelve subiects were randomly
assigned to each of the two groups. Eleven women and one man were
judges for the rank ordering phase of the experiment. Their ages
ranged from 17 to 28 years with a mean age of 21.42 and a standard
deviat'ion of g.60. Subiects and iudges took part in the experiment
individually and all instructions were written.
Stimulus Material
A Nikkormat camera fitted with an F2 50nm lens and ultra violet
fi'lter was used to make one set of slides. The camera was set on
a tripod so that each slide was taken from a fixed stationary point.
The
was
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sequence was taken by natural light and Kodachrome ASA 64 film
used.
The total slide set used in the experiment consisted of 120
slides, of which 96 depicted an action-sequence in a consistent and
progressive manner and of which 24 changed some aspect of the
sequence according to a rule. The action-sequence involved four
actors and the setting was a park bench. The story was a series of
encounters between men and women which resulted in new friendships.
The outline of the story is as follows;
A young man is seated on a park bench. He opens a bag of fruit and
begins to eat. An older man arrives and sits on the other end of
the bench. The two men converse for a while and then the older man
begins to read a magazine. A young woman appears and arranges her
hair then sits on the bench between the two men. She lights a
cigarette. The young man Strikes up a conversation with her and
offers her sorne fruit which she accepts. They talk and finally
leave together. The older man watches them go and then continues
to read.his magazine. An older woman arrives and sits on the
bench. She begins to feed some birds whilst engaging in conversa-
tion with the older man. The older man leaves after a while but
forgets his magazine. The woman picks up the magazine and is read-
ing it when he returns to collect it. He sits down again and they
talk and then both feed the birds and finally leave together.
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Before photographinE the action-sequence it was rehearsed by
the actors and tirned. The real-time duration of the sequence was
approximately 11 minutes and each of the 96 slides depicting the
Sequences was taken on cue at equal intervals of 7 seconds through-
out the action.
The twenty-four Transformations used in this experiment changed
some aspect of the actual action in such a way that although each
was similar to the 96 slides which depicted the sequence, each
differed from them according to one of four rules. Six Transforma-
tions were made for each of the four rules which were; (a)
Addition: An obiect which might reasonabjy appear in such a setting
but which has not been inc'luded was added. For example, the young
man was shown with a briefcase beside him. (b) Token: Some change
was made in the appearance of an actor. For example, the older
woman was shown wearing a cardigan. (c) Perspective: A wide-angle
lens (F2 28nrn) was substituted for the F2 50nrn lens. (d)
Orientation: Dupl'icates of six of the 96 slides were made and
reversed with respect to 'left-right orientation.
In photographing the action-sequence Transformations were
Spaced at approximate'ly equal intervals over the course of the
whole activity. The rule chosen when the tirp came to make a
Transformation was determined randomly with the constraint that
there should be six slides made for each rule. Addition, Token,
and Perspective slides were made at the same time as the 96 slides
depicting the activity. The action was 'frozen' at the appropriate
moment, the change made, the photograph taken and then the original
scene was restored.
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Apparatus
Slides were projected onto a white wall by means of two Kodak
Carousel SAV 2000 projectors which operated in direct succession.
The projected image was .45 x .69m for both acquisition and test
stimuli, and subiects sat approximately 1.5m from the screen. Each
slide was shown for 4 seconds and there was no interstimulus
interval. This was the case for both acquisition and test presenta-
tion. Exposure duration was determined by Gerbrands tachistoscopic
shutters mounted in front of the projector lenses. Shutter operation
was timed by solid state prograrrning apparatus-
For the memory phase of the experiment, pen and paper were
provided for subiects to write their accounts of the story. l'lhen
they later perfonned the recognition memory test, electronic
prograrrning apparatus was used to record subjects' decisions and
reaction times. Subiects had to press one of tvlo mounted micro'
switches on each trial to indicate their decision. The apparatus
was programred so that latencies of greater than 4 seconds were
defined aS a ''No Response' trial. The criterion for accept'ing a
subject's data was set at no more than 1.0 No Response triais.
For the rank-ordering (and rating) phase of the experiment' pen and
paper were provided for judges to make notes.
Prpcedure
Randomi sation: Four groups of evenly spaced Belonging slides
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could be extracted from the sequence of 96 slides: that is s'lide
numbers 1., 5, 9, 13, ... etc. (Set A)i slide numbers 2,6, L0'
14, ... etc. (Set B); slide numbers 3' 7, LL, 15, ." etc' (Set C);
or slide numbers 4, 8, L2, 16, ... etc. (Set D), There were'
therefore, four sets of 72-frame action-sequences or Original slides
each with a cor0"esponding set of twenty-four Be]ongings.
In the Acquisition phase of the memory experiment Subiects 1'
5 and 9 in both the 0rdered and Disordered Presentation groups saw
Set A 0riginals; Subiects 2, 6 and 10 saw Set B; Subiects 3, 7 and
ll.sawSetC;andSubiects4,sandL2sawSetD.Subiectsinthe
0rdered Presentation condition saw slides in the correct chronolog-
ical order and subjects in the Disordered Presentation condition
saw them in a random order (the sanre random order for each set).
In the Test phase of the memory experiment, the seventy-two
slides for each subiect in both experimental groups cgnsisted of
twenty-four of the Original slides they had seen during acqu'isition'
the corresponding set of twenty-four Belonging slides, and a'll
twenty-four Transformation slides. Original slides for the test
were chosen randomly without rep'lacement so that, for exarnp'le, in
the case of Set A - Subiects 1, 5 and 9 in both groups - Subiects
1 saw tlventy-four randomly selected 0rigina'l slides, Subiects 5 saw
twenty-four Original slides randomly selected from the remaining
forty-eight, and Subiects 9 saw the remaining twenty-four. In this
way, it was assured that during testing over the course of the
experiment for each group each Original was sampled three times,
each Belonging was sampled three times' and each Transformation
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slide was sampled twelve times. The seventy-two test slides were
presented in a random order which was the same for corresponding
subiects in both experimental conditions-
In the rank-ordering (and rating) phase of the experiment'
judges saw all 95 action-sequence slides. Although this meant that
they were not seeing the exact combination that any one subiect had
seen, it made it possible for the iudges to rank-order and rate all
twenty-four stories produced by the subiects in the memory phase of
the experiment. 0ther methods, such as different iudges for
different sets, or the same judges seeing all four sets, presented
considerable practica'l problems either in terms of procedure or
subsequent data analysis. Therefore, although the mthod used was
not ideal, it was considered to be the most practical.
Memory phase of the experiment: The memory phase of the
experiment consisted of three parts - acquis'it'ion, story writing'
and recognition test.
In the acquisition part, subiects were told that they were
taking part in a memory experiment and were asked to try to remember
the slides which were about to be shown to them. The 72 0riginals
were then Presented.
Inmediately after presentation, subjects were asked to write
the story. The main body of the instructions were the same for both
groups of subiects:
'i^lrite down what happened irn the story as simply but
as accurately as possib'le. Be sure that you identify
any characters you refer to in some way (fon example'
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by dress, or age, or hair, etc.)' You have ten
minutes in which to do this .
For the ordered Presentation group this was prefaced by:
A11 of the slides together that you have iust seen
depicted a simple story. You saw them in their
correct order. 0n the paper provided' try to
describe the story depicted by the slides you have
just seen'.
For the Disordered Presentation group the preface was:
A11 of the slides together that you have iust seen
depicted a simple story. You saw them iumbled up'
0n the paper provided, try to describe the story
depicted by the slides you have iust seen, as if you
had been shown them in their corect order''
If subjects had not finished writing the story after ten
minutes they were g'iven extra time in blocks of two minutes' Three
subjects each required an extra four minutes - tno from the
0rdered group and one from the Disordered group. 0ther subiects
found ten minutes adequate-
After the subiects had written their story, they were then
given a set of instructions explaining the recognition phase of
the experiment. Subiects were asked to press one of the two buttons
in front of them according to whether they thought they had seen
Vlere*t,r iJ r'l'v€RslTY o'F wELLINGToN
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the test slide before or not. They were asked to decide as quick'ly
and as accurately as possible. They were requested to use their
index fingers to respond and the decision represented by each
button was counterbalanced across presentation groups. Half the
subjects used the left button to indicate "seen before" and half
used the right button to indicate trseen before". They were
examined in their understanding of the instructions and were
trained in the procedure before the test began. Test slides were
tlren presented and subjects' responses were automatically recorded.
Rank-ordering and rat-ing phase of the experiment: The rank-
ordering and rating phase of the experiment took place after all
data from the ltlemory phase had been co]]ected. The stories written
by the subjects were typed so that problems of individual hand-
writing would not interfere with assessment. The iudges were given
instructions which exp:lained exactly what was going to occur (except
that they were not forewarned of the rating task); They were told
that they would be shown a s'lide sequence which depicted a simple
story, after which they would be able to make notes' if they chose
to do so, about what had occurred in the story. They would then be
given a set of 24 descriptions of the story which they would be
asked to read through once each in the order in which they were
given them. (Each iudge saw a different random order of the
stories). Next they would be shown the slide sequence a second
time, and again have the opportunity to make notes if they wished.
When they were ready, they would be taken to another room where
there would be a long table and plenty of space to sort out the
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stories. Their instructions would be to rank-order the stories so
that the top story in their final selected pile was "the one which
came closest to the story the! had seen", the second oneo the next
close, and so on, so that the bottom story in the pile was the one
which came least close to the story they had seen-
They were told that when viewing the slide sequences it was
important for them to rernember who did what in the story and in
what order. They were advised to pay careful attention to this
when asking themselves how close a descrription care to the story
and that details of dress, or age, or hair, etc. were important
only in as much as they were ways to identify the characters in the
story. They would be given as much time as they needed to complete
the rank-ordering task.
0n average the entire rank-ordering phase of the experiment
took each judge approximately two hours to complete. When they had
finished the rank-ordering and the order was Y'ecordbd by the
experimenter, thqy were asked to assign a number between 1 and L0
to each story, where 10 indicated that it was extremely close to
the orig'inal and L ind'icated that it was not at all close to the
original .
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Resul ts
Rank-ordering and rating data: The rank-order assigned to
each individual story by each of the twelve independent judges was
averaged over the stories produced by each experinnntal group' The
mean rank-order for the set of stories produced by the 0rdered
Presentation group was 7.83 (SD = 4.86), and for the stories
produced by the Disordered presentation group the mean was 17'l'7
(sD = 5.38), ! (23) = 6.20, P. < .dot The difference in mean
ranks was considered to be convincing evidence that the iudges
decided that stories written by subiects who had seen an Qrdered"
Presentation were closer to the original than stories written by
the Disordered' Presentation group.
If each of the L2 stories from the ordered group had been
assigned a rank-order between L and 12 and each of the 12 storires
from the Disordered-group had been assigned a rank-order between 13
and 24 (.i.e. perfect division of groups on the dimension of
'closeness to the origina'l') the mean rank-order for 0rdered Eroups'
stories would be 6,5 and the mean rank-order for Disordered'groups'
stories would be 18.5. Random assignment of rank-order [i.e. no
difference between the two groups) would theoretica'l'ly produce a
rean rank-order for both groups which approached t2.5 as the number
of trials increased. The actual mean ranks obtained were close to
those associated with exact separation,. The degree of inter-judge
agreement was reasonably high, according to Kendall's Coefficient
of Concordance which was h| = .72.
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The rank-ordering resultsn therefore, showed that there was a
clear division between the two experimental groups. Although the
Disordered Presentation group was specifically asked to re-order the
randomly presented slides and attempt to reconstruct the underlying
event they produced stories that were iudged to be significantly
less close to the actual story than stories written by the 0rdered'
Presentation grouP.
It was possible that even irf iudges categorized stories from
the Disordered.Presentation group as relatjve1y less close to the
original than stories from the Qrdered'Presentation group, the
Disordered Presentation groups' stories might in fact sti'll be very
close to the original. Therefore' the rating task prov'ided supple-
mentary data to assess whether this was the case
The mean rating for stories from the Disordered'Presentation
group was 2.97 (SD = 1.58), significantly lower than that for
stories from the Ordered. Presentation group 6.27 (SD = l'.39) ' t
(zg) = 66.33, g < .001 , where a score of t had indicated that the
story was not at all close to the original and a score of 10 indi-
cated extreme closeness. Therefore' not only were the two grqups
of stories distinguished by iudges, but moreover the stories
produced by the Disordered Presentation group were not close to
the original story.
Recognition test data: The mean (and standard deviation)
proportion of Hits and False Alarns for each Presentation condition
are shown in Table 7. The Hit and False Alarm rates for each subiect
weFe converted into d' values and the means (and standard deviations)
are given in Table 8.
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TABLE 7
lrban (and standard deviation) Hit and False Alarm progortions for
Di sordered pr:esentati on condi ti ons
Oriqinals, Belongings, and Transformations for 0rdered and
Presentation TYPe Test Slide Type
Ori gi nal Belonging Transformation
0rdered .80(.t01 .68(.1s) .15(.041
Di sordered .76(.12) .65(.16)
.13(.08)
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TABLE 8
Belonoinqs (0:B) and 
-Oiiginals t0 Transfonnations (0:T)
for 0rdered and Disordered presentation conditions
l',lean (and standard deviation) d' scores for Originals to
Presentat'ion Type Distractor Type
0:B 0:T
0rdered .40(.52) 1.99(.43)
Di sordered .33(.2e) 2.03(.74)
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An ANOVA which examined Presentation Type (betneen-subiect)
and Distractor Type (within-subject) showed no effect of Presenta-
tion but a strong effect of Distractor, F (L,22) = 141..04' l4Se =
.?3, p <..001 with d'0:T higher than d'0:8. There was no inter-
acti on.
Reaction time data are presented in Table 9 where the means
(and standard deviations) ane shown separately for "Yes" and "No"
responses. Since "No" RTs tend to be slotver than "Yes" RTs, Yes
and No responses were treated separately in order to avoid confound-
ing of the experimental variables with response type. Similarly'
correct and incorrect responses were analysed separately. It was,
thereforen not possible to compare RTs for all three types of test
slide together. Accordingly, analysis of the reaction time data
was restricted to the following: Two ANQVAS examined RTs to
di stractors separately for rrYesrr and for "No" responses; and
two !-tests examined RTs to 0riginals separately for "Yes" and "No"
responses.
The data were adiusted for missing ce11s ("firf, 1966, pp. 146-
147) since one subject in the Disordered Presentation condition
correctly rejected al'l Transformations and one subject in the
Disordered. Presentation condition correctly accepted all 0r'iginals
and falsely accepted all Belongings.
An /\N0VA of the "Yes" [Incorrect) RT data which examined
Presentation Type [between-subiect) and Distractor Type (within-
subject) showed no main effects and no t'nteraction. When subiects
falsely accepted distractors there was no s'ignificant difference
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TABLE 9
Mean (and standard deviation) RTs to Originals' Belonoings and
Transformqllgns for 0rdered and Disordered presentation co{tditions
Presentation Type Test Slide Type
Ori gi na1 Be'l ongi ng Transformati on
Given that the subiect responded "YES"
0rdered 1885 1975 2030(271) (356) (48e)
Disordered tV93 1832 1898(362) (337) (446)
Given that the subiect responded "N0"
0rdered 2062 2108 1687(301) (508) (334)
Disordered 2L92 2091 1561(428) (441) (srz1
-r22-
in RTs between Belongings and Transformations. There was also no
difference between the 0rdered' Presentation and Disordered"Presenta-
tion conditions.
A similar analysis was made of the "No" (correct) RT data.
There was no effect of Presentation but a strong effect of Distrac-
tor, F (1,21) = 42.89, lvtse = 63143, p <.001 with Transformations
rejected more quickly than Be'longings. There was no interaction'
For "No" (Incorrect) responses to originals there was no
significant difference bebveen the nnan RTs of Ordered Presentation
and Disordered.Presentation subiects (t (22) < 1). Similarly there
was no signifr'cant difference between the mean "Yes" (Coryect) RTs
of Qrdered..Presentation and Di sorderedr,Presentation subiects
(t (21) < 1).
Di scussion
The stimulus material used in this experiment could not be
reorganised' successfully when presented in a disorganised sequence.
Even when specifically asked to try to reconstruct the disordered
slides.into the underlying ordered story subiects were unable to do
so. Independent iudges ranked stories written by the Disordered
Presentation subiects as less close to the actual story than
stories written by subjects from the 0rdened Presentation group
and rated them not c'lose to the original story. Although these
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findings are not consistent with the maiority of linguistic recon-
struction experiments, it must be pointed out that this material
did not have a fami'liar and strong thematic structure (Von Diik'
Lg77) which could be reconstructed easily. However, it should also
be noted that subjects in the Ordered Presentation condition were
able to describe the underlying story quite accurately'
The main effect reported by Jenkins et al. (1978) and demon-
strated in the previous three experiments in this study was
replicated with the long s'lide sequence. But the crucial test
offered by comparison of Cfdered versus Eisordered Fresentations
showed that the argument that Belonging slides are falsely accepted
because of their consistency with the abstracted event does not
seem to be tenable.
Despite the fact that subiects werewwble to reconstruct the
underlying story when given a disordered presentation of acquisition
slides, the d'0:B values for this group were significantly lower
than the d'0:T values and their recognition performance did not
differ from that of the subjects who saw ordered acquisition slides-
If subjects are not able to form a representation of the event in
the first place then Belong'ings do not belong to any event and
false acceptance of Belongings cannot be due to fusion. tt is more
likely, as the earlier experiments indicated, that Transformations
are more frequently reiected on a recognition test than Belongings'
not because they are inconsistent with the meaning of the event
seen during acquisition or with the rejationships which define the
event, but because they have fewer features in common with Originals
than do Be'longings.
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Reaction time data analysis showed that not only were Transfor-
mations more frequently rejected than Belongings' they were aiso reiected
more quickly. However, although Belongings were more frequently
accepted, they were not accepted more quickly than were Transfor-
mati ons.
These results support a featural interpretation of the d' data
and are most easily explained in terms of a memory-scanning model
of recognition memory. With such models, the subiect 'is described
as comparing a test item to items stored in memory and the subject's
reaction t'ime on a given test item is thought to reflect the number
of comparisons made, the time required for each comparison, and the
extent to which comparisons may be made simultaneously. Although
the times involved can be assessed only approximately, a tentative
explanation can be offered, along the same lines as B'iederman's
interpretation of RT data in his contextual studies.
When the subject views an individual test slide, if there is
no diagnostic feature in the slide which strikes him as new, then
a search may take place either until a match with an 0riginal
slide is found, or a mis-match is maden or until the search is
tenninated without finding a match. It is also possible that these
processes operate consecutively - a vigi'lance for new features and
an automatic search for a match, the search being terminated if a
new feature is spotted or when the matching process is resolved
teither correctly or incorrectly).
The Transformations have fewer features in conrnon with
Originals than do Belongings. Each of the four types of Transfor-
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mations offers a potentially new feature - whether'it be the addit'ion
of an object, a token change in dress, o left-right orientat'ion
reversal, or a perspective change. New features in the Belonging
slides would not be available to the same extent, since they are
the same as 0riginals in tenns of the basic comPonents of the
picture, being different primarily in terms of composition.
Belongings and Qriginals would also, therefore, tend to have the
same degree of specific detail and genera'l fami'liarity' whereas
with the introduction of a featural change, Transformations would
have greater specific infonnation (Loftus & Bel'|, 1975). In the
case of the correct reiections of the distractors' where Transfor-
mations were reiected more quickly than Belongings, it seems likely
that a new feature was spotted in the Transformations which resulted
in faster reiection. Hoheven, in th.e case of Belongings' the search-
for-match process would take precedence and the search time involved
would account for the longer RTs. When the subiect falsely accepts
a distractor slide, it is presumably on the basis of a match (or a
decision in favour of that). So when the subiect accepts Transfor-
mations and Belongings it is as a result of the sarB process - and
the RTs are not significantly dffferent-
-L26-
EXPERIMENT V
Introduction
In the previous expertment, it was demonstrated that subiects
who saw a set of disordered slides during acquisition were not able
to reconstruct those slides to form the event they depicted when
presented in their correct chronological order. A subsequent
recognition memory test had shown that with this material the
performance of subiects who had seen a dfsordered version did not
differ from that of subiects who had seen the ordered sequence.
It was concluded that the fusion hypothesis was not supported by
the results which. were accounted for by the relative featural
detail of the two types of distractors. The aim of the present
experiment was to confirm that the results of the recognition
memory test in the previous experiment were not influenced by the
intervening writing task.
Apart from the absence of the writing task, this experiment
was an exact replication in terms of design, method, randomisatiOn,
and subject pool. It was assumed, therefore, without further
demonstration, that subjects who saw the ordered acquisition slides
were able to form a coherent story consistent with the one actually
depicted, whereas subjects who saw the disordered version were not.
This experiment was a more direct test of the fusion interpretation
in that subjects were given the recognttion test inmediately after
acquisi ti on.
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Consistent with the previous rationale, it is argued that if
the differential performance on distractors is due to fusion then
the difference between d'0lB and dt0:T should be greater for the
0rdered Presentation than for Disordered hesentation. If perfor-
mance is determined by the featural context of the slides then
there should be no difference in performance between the two groups.
Having established in the previous experiment that subiects
were not able to reconstruct this pictorial sequence, it was
decided to make a specific examination of reiection rates to the
four Transformation Types in Experiment V. Kraft and Jenkins (fgZZ)
found that orientation reversals were detected easily when subiects
had been presented with acquisition slides in a consistent way with
respect to orientation. They varied not only whether the presenta-
tion was consistent with respect to orientation, but also whether
it was consistent with respect to temporal (or chrono'logical)
order. They found that recognition of orientation reversal was
high regardless of whether subiects had seen slide sequences in an
ordered or disordered version but argued that subiects "in the
random order context condition were able to construct coherent
events even th6ugh the slides were in random order" (p. 399). The
present experiment, therefore, tested whether order of presentation
affects identification of orientation ,neversal distractors. In
this experiment all subjects saw acquisition slides in a consistent
left-to-r'ight orientation, but temporal order was varied.
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Method
Subjects
Subiects were 22 woflEn and two men. Their 
.ages ranged from
L7 to 41 years with a rnan age of 24.57 and a standard deviation of
7.89. The design rlas a 2 [Ordered versus Disordered) X 2
[Belonging versus Transformation) factoria] with repeated measures
on the second factor. Twelve subiects were randomly assigned to
each of the two groups. Four subiects were dropped from this
experiment - two because of equipment failure, and two because
they did not reach the pre-determined criterion of no more than 10
no response trials. These subiects were replaced. Subiects took
part individually and all instructions were written.
Procedure
Stimulus material, apparatus, and randomisation were the same
as in Experiment tV. Simi'larly, procedure was the same except that
subjects were not given the Stsr.y-writing task. Other instructions
were i.dentical to those used in Experiment trV.
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Resul ts
The same analyses were performed on the data from this experi-
ment as on the data from Experiment IV. Additional analyses were
performed where the two experiments (IV and V) were treated as a
between-subject factor. The mean (and standard deviation) propor-
tion of Hits and False Alarms for each Presentation condition are
shown in Table 10. The Hit and False Alarm rates for each subiect
were converted into d' values and the. means (and standard deviations)
are given in Table 11.
An AN0VA which examined Presentation Type [between-subiect)
and Distractorn Type [within-subject) shorved no effect of Presenta-
tion but a strong effect of Distractor, L(L,ZZ) = 85.05, MSe =
.39, p < .00L with d'0:T higher than dr0;8. There was no inter-
action. An ANOVA which exanrined Experiment IV versus V (between-
subject factor), Presentation Type, and Distractor Type, showed a
reiiable effect of Experiment, I (1'44) = 7.39, MSe = .57' g < .01,
no effect of Presentation, a strong effect of Dfstractoro F (1,44)
= 2!1.55, MSe = .31., [< .001, and no interactions. Subjects in
the present experiment performed with greater accuracy than subiects
in the previous experiment. The mean d's for the Ordered condition
were 1..71. and 1.19 for Experiments V and [V respectively, and for
the Disordered condition,1.50 and 1.18 for Experiments V and IV
respectively.
Reaction time data are presented in Table L2 where the means
(and standard deviations) are shown separately for "Yes" and "No'r
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TABLE 10
l'lean (and standard (eviationl Hit and False Alarm propor$ions for
Di so,rdercd prFseltation condi tions
Presentation TYPe Test Slide Type
Original BelonEing Transformation
.86(.tg) .67(.20) .14(.13)
Di sordered .79(. tg) .58(.11)
.12
( .12)
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TABLE 11
l*'han (and standard deYiationl d' scores for 0riginals to
Belongings (0:B) and Originils to Transfonrntions (0:T) for
Ordered and Disordered presentation condilions
Presentation TyPe Distractor Type
0:T0:B
0rdered .83(.rg) 2.59(t.os)
Di sordered .72( .se1
2.29(.e4)
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TABLE 12
Mean (and standard deviation\ RTs to 0riqinals' Belonoings and
T"unrformations for ordered and Disordered presentation conditions
Presentation TYPe Test Slide TYPe
Original Belonging Transformation
Given that the subiect responded "YES"
0rdered 1823 1996 L892(.440) (Stsl (5s5)
Disordered L62A 1690 1877(424\ (431) (607)
Given that the subiect responded "N0"
0rdered 2186 2075 1578(516) (581) G77)
Di sordered 1943 1888 1433(481) (so4) (343)
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responses. Two ANOVAs examined Presentation Type (between-subiect
factor) and Distractor Type (within-subiect factor) for "Yes"
(Incomect) RTs, and separately for "No" (Correct) RTs. Two L-tests
exanined Presentation Type for "Yes" (Correct) RTs, and separately
for "No" (Incorrect) RTs. The RT data were adiusted for missing
cells (Kirk, 1966, pp. L46-147) since two Ordered Presentation
and two Disordered.Presentation subiects correctly reiected al'l
Transformations and three 0rdered Presentation and one Disordered'
Presentation subiect correctly accepted all Originals and falsely
accepted al'l Belongings.
An AN0VA on the "Yes" (Incorrect) RTs showed no effect of Present-
ation or Distractor and .rio interaction. When subjects falsely
accepted distractors, there was no significant difference in RTs
between Belongings and Transformations. There was also no difference
between the 0rdered. Presentation and Disordered Presentat'ion
conditions. This result confirmed the finding in Experiment IV.
An ANOVA which examined Experiment IV versus Experiment V (a
between-subiect factor), Presentation Type, and Distractor Type'
showed no main effects and no interactions. Thereforen the two
experiments were not significantly different with respect to "Yes"
RT data for distractors.
Simi'lar analyses were made of the "No" (Correct) RTs. Again
the result confirmed the findings of Experiment IV. There was no
effect of Presentatt'on but a strong effect of Distractor, F 11,22)
= 33.07, MSe = 822?7, p < .00L with Transformations rejected more
quickly than Belongings. There was no interaction. An ANOVA which
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introduced the tun experiments as an additional between-subiect
factor, showed no effect of Experiment' no effect of Presentation,
and a strong effect of Distractor, I (1,43) = 74.45' MSe = 72907,
p < .001 (Transformation being rejected faster than Belongings).
There were no interactions.
For "No" (Incorrect) responses to 0riginals, there was no
significant difference between the mean RTs of Orderred'Presentation
and Disordered.,Presentation subiects, (L(18) < 1)- An AN0VA
which examined Experiments IV versus V (a between-subiect factor)
and Presentation Type (a between-subiect factor) showed no main
effects and no interaction.
Similarly there was no significant drifference bebveen the mean
"yes'r (Comect) RTs of Ordered Presentation and Disordered'Presenta-
tion subjects, (t (22) < 1). An AN0VA which introduced Experiment
IV versus V as a betvleen-subject factor showed no effects of either
Experiment or Presentation and no interaction.
Responses to the Transformations - of which there were four
types, Addition, Orientation, Perspective, and Token - were analysed
in greater detai'1. The mean (.and standard deviation) proportion
correct responses are given in Table 13.
An AN0VA which examined Presentation Type (between-subiect)
and Transformation Type (uithin-subiect), showed no effect of
presentation, but a significant effect of type of Transformation,
I (3,66) = 5.90, Ir[Se = 268, [ < .01. There was no interaction.
A subsequent Sheff6 test showed that Orientation slides were
significantly better detected than Token and Additi0rr P < .001.
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TABLE 13
lvban (and standard deviation) proportion of correct reiections of
Addition, Orientation, Perspective and Token Transformation types
for 0rdered' and Disordered present+tion conditions
Presentation TyPe Transfonnation Type
Addition Orientation Perspective Token
Ordered .85(. tr) .93(.13) .94(.11) .75(.26)
Di sordered .76(.24) .98(.06) .90(.2s) .85(. ta1
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Perspective slides were better detected than Token and Addition'
p < .01. There was no significant difference between Perspective
and Orientation, and none between Token and Addition-
Di scussion
The main effect reported by Jenkins 6t a'|. (1978) and demon-
strated in the previous experiments in this series was again
replicated. The d'0:T values were st'gnificantly higher than d'0:B
values. l4oreover, as in Experiment IV, performance did not differ
between the two experimental groups. Despite seeing a disordened
story [which had been shown in Experiment IV to be not re-orderable)
subjects exhibited d' values for both.0:B and 0:T which did not
differ from those of subiects who had seen an ordered presentation.
The difference between the two experiments was that in
Experiment IV subjects had a writing task before their recognition
test which.introduced a delay factor of about 14 minutes and which
effectively represented a recall test. Since the third experiment
in this series had shown that perfonnance was not affected by a
delay of 24 hours, it seemed unlikely that delay was a significant
factor. It would appear, therefore, to be the task itself which
impaired performance in Experiment IV compared to the present exper-
iment. It is iikely that the nature of the task (or possibly
simply being given a task) produced interference. It has been
- 137-
argued that nemory for surface form is impaired when subiects are
given a non-featural task to perform (Hunt & E]liott, 1980). The
writing task in Experiment IV required subiects to form a verbal
and predominantly Semantic account of the presentation material,
whereas the subsequent recognition test examined memory for d'iscrete
pictorial items.
The results of the RT analyses confirmed the d' findings -
that there was no difference in performance between subJects who
saw'slides in an Ordered Presentation and subjects who saw a
Disordered Presentation. The distractor RT analysis adds vleight to
the d' analysis - not only were Transformations reiected more
frequently than Belongings, they were reiected more quickly.
However, although Belongings were accepted more frequently than
Transformations, they were not accepted more quickly. An interpre-
tation of this result was given in the discussion section of the
previous experiment.
The finding that Qrientation slides were the most frequently
detected Transformations independently of presentation order is
congruent with Kraft and Jenkins (1977). However, although Kraft
and Jenkins' Disordered Presentation group may have reconstructed
the event, subjects in the present experiment could not. It seems
likely, therefore, that a maior factor in the ease with which
subjects detect Orientation reversals is consistency of orientation
during presentat'ion.
In sumnary, this experiment, which was a replication of
Experiment IV (with the exception that there was no recall test)
showed that there was no di fference in response pattern between
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subjects who saw an ordened.presentation of the stimulus material
and subJects who saw a disordertd presentation" Slnce subJects in
Experlment IV, who saw a disordered version 1x€re unable to re-
construct the story (and it may be assrmpd that the same was true
for subJects in the present experlment), it can be concluded that
fusion was not resBonsible for the low d'O;B conpared to dt0:T,
since Disordered Presentation subiects could not have abstracted
the underlying event.
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EXPERIMENT VI
Introducti on
Previous experiments in this series had found no support for
Jenkin's fusion interpretation of differential detection of distrac-
tor types, despite systematic tests of his hypothesis. However,
neither had specific evidence been found for the alternative
hypothesis which argued that d'0:B values were low compared to dr0:T
values because Belongings had more features in cormon with Origina1s
than did Transformations, and were' therefore, more confusable. A
more direct attempt was now made to show that the surface structure
of stimulus material is a maior detevminant of recognition memory.
The main problem to overcome in examining the effects of the
meaning and features of stirnulus material is to achieve. a separation
of the variables with no confounding. Fo'llowing the procedure of
Jenkins et al. (1978), the main way in which meaning was varied
whi'le holding physica'l features constant was to include Transforma-
tions,the meaning of which was inconsistent with that of the event
by virtue of the changed detail. But as it has been argued here,
that change also represented a change in physicai features. However,
the task of holding rnaning censtant while varying physical features
was equally problematic since any change in features may also
produce a change in meaning. Although some research has produced
this kind of distinction with sca'led material [Mandler & Stein,
1974i Posnero 1969) or arbitrarily labelled material (Rafnel &
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Klatzky, 1978), systematic distinction and quantification of the
variables did not seem possible with complex pictorial stimuli
involving many featural details, colours, and spatial and temporal
relati onshi ps .
Despite these difficulties, it was considered to be essential
to attempt to vary features whilst holding meaning constant' if
only by an approximation, to find more specific evidence of a
featural account. This was done in the final experiment by exc'lud*
ing Transfonnations and varying the featural s'imi'larity of Belong-
ings to 0riginals.
By definition, the rneaning of Belongings is consistent with the
overall event, and their meaning is therefore held constant. 0n the
assumption that featural simi'larity between a single pair of slides
would vary inversely with their chronological distance in the story
sequence, featural similarity of Belongings was manipulated by
choosing sets of Belongings which were imrnediately adiacent to
0riginal slides of the acquisition set and sets of Belongings which
were nonadjacent to the Originals. By selecting different 24-s1ide
sequences of Originals and presenting all 96-slides in the recog-
nition test, the variabte of adiacency was examined wr'thin-subiect'
and adjacent 'Near' slides for some subiects Were nonadjacent 'Far'
for others and vice versa.
According to Jenkins et al. (1978) notion of fusion, d' measures
for the discrimination between Originals and Near Belongings (d'0:N)
should not differ from d's for the discrimination between Origrinals
and Far Belongings (_dtO;F). But r'f recognitfon performance is based
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on the featura'l similarity between Belongings and Qriginals,
d' (0:F) should be greater than d' (0:N).
l"lethod
Sub.iects
Subjects were six women and ten men. Their ages ranged from
18 to 51. years with a mean age of 25.63 and a standard deviation
of tL.77. The experiment was a within-subiect design so that al'l
subjects served in both experimental lNear and Far distractor)
conditi ons.
Stimul us I'ilaterial and Apparatus
The stimulus material was the same as that used in Experiments
IV and V except that Transformations were not used. The apparatus
was also the same.
Procedure
Four sets of evenly spaced 0riginals could be withdrawn from
the overall sequence of 96 slidesl that is slide numbers 1,5,9,
13 ... etc. (Set A); numbers 2, 6, 10, 14 ,,. etc. [Set B);
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numbers 3,'7,11, 15 ... etc. (Set C); and numbers 4, 8, L2, L6
etc. (Set D). There were therefore four sets of 24-frare action-
sequences of Originals each with a corresponding set of Belongings.
From the remaining set of 72 Belongings there were 24 Far slides
for each set of Orig'inals and 48 Near slides - half of which
occurred before and half of which occurred after the related
Original sIide. Half the subiects saw Nears which occurred before
the 0riginals and half the subiects saw Nears which occurred after
the Originals. Thus the design was counterbalanced so that every
slide was used an equal number of times as an 0riginal, Near and
Far. Subjects !,2,9, and 1.0 saw Set A in acquisition (where on
testing subjects 1 and 2 saw Nears which occurred before 0riginals
and subjects 9 and L0 saw Nears which occurred after 0riginals).
Subjects 3,4,11., and 12 saw Set B; subiects 5,6, L3n and 14 saw
Set C; and subjects 7,8,15, and 16 saw Set D.
In the data analysis, slide numbers 1r 2,3, 4, and numbers
93, 94, 95, 96 were not included"since with Set A (where slide
number 1 was an 0r'iginal ) there was no Near which occurred before
the Original and also with this set slide number 96 was not a vaiid
Near. Similarly with Set D (where slide number 96 was an 0riginal)
there was no Near which occurred after that original and at'trso with
this set,slide number 1 was not a valid Near. Therefore, although
during the course of the experiment all slides were tested, responses
to the first and final four slides from the set of 96 were not
included in analysis. Thus on the recognition test, subiects were
scored out of 22 responses for each kind of slide - 0riginalso
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Nears, and Fars. In acquisition, slides were shown in their correct
chronological order and in the test were shown in d'ifferent random
orders for each subiect.
In the acquisition phase of the experiment subiects were told
that they were taking part in a memory experiment and were asked to
try to rerember the slides which were about to be shown to them.
The 24 $riginal slides were then presented. As in the previous
experiments, slides were shown for 4 seconds eacbwith no inter-
stimulus interval.
Irrnediately after presentation, subiects were given the same
recogn'ition rnmory test instructions as in Experiments IV and V.
Subjects' decision and reaction timeitivere recorded automatically
for each of the 72 test slides.
Resul ts
The mean (and standard deviation) proportion Hits for
0riginals was .75 (-.14) and False Alarms for Nears was .45 [.i9)
and for Fars was .41 (.17). The mean (and standard deviation ) d'
scores for 0riginals to Nears (.d'0;N) was .89 (.41) and for
0riginals to Fars (d'O:F) was .96 t.36). These d' scores wene not
significantly different (! (|fl < l.). Reaction tine data are
presented in Table 14. As in previous experiments RT data were
analysed separately for the "Yes" and "No" responses, and for the
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TABLE 14
Mean (and standard deviation\ RTs to 0riqinals' Nears and Fars
Test Slide Type
Origi nai Near Far
Given that the subiect responded "YES'
1880(2e3)
2059
(53e)
2098
(468)
Given that the subiect responded "N0"
2t54
(43e)
2035 L970(408) (300)
Correct
ence in
cases t
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and Incomect resPonses.
either "Yes" or "Not' RTs
(ts ) < 1).
There was no significant differ-
for Nears versus Fars (in both
Di scussion
No differences in responses to Nears and Fars were found with
either d' or. RT measures. If the two types of distractor did
differ with respect to simi'larity to Originals, then this did not
affect perfonnance.
It was possible that with the material used, chrono'logical
distance did not in fact vary featural similarity. Although the
sequence of slides which depicted the story was progressive and
continuous, the action within these slides had not been des'igned
specifically to ensure that a slide which was tar from a given
original was necessarily less similar to it than one which was
Near. However, further experiments along the lines suggested in
this final experiment, but with material which systematica]ly
varied featural sim'ilarity by chronological distance within a
consistent event,might establish more explicity the role of
featural detail in memory for picture stories-
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GENERAL pISCUSSIof\l
The experiments in this thesis investigated a fusion account
of recognition memory for pictorial sequences. Jenkins et al.
(1978) had found that after viewing .temporalTy ordered pi'cture
stortes, subjects tended to discriminate wel'l between original
slides and Transformation distractors which were inconsistent with
the storyrcompared to their ability to. discriminate between
Originals and Belonging distractors which were consistent with the
story. Jenkins interpreted the differential response to distractor
types as evidence of fwian-, where recognition performance was
based on the comparison of new slides to the abstracted schema of
the total event depicted in acquisition. He had defended this
interpretation against an alternative account which argues that
recognition perfonnance is determined by the relative featural
similarity between distractor types and origina'l slides.
This thesis does not dispute the influence of the overall
meaning of stimulus material on flEmory, nor the particular Phenom-
enon of abstraction of the relationships between a series of related
items presented over time. However, it argues that the featural
composition of stimulus material should be an integral part of any
interpretation of recognition perfonnance unless the effect of
featural sim'ilarity is explicity controlled.
It is clear that both the meaning and features of stimulus
materiai contributes to performance in studies of perception and
memory. Numerous studies provide converging evidence that meaning
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is a crucial factor in determining the degree of memory accuracy
and durabi'lity (Bower & Karlin, L974i Craik & Lockhart, L972;
Kintsch, !974; Mistler-Lachman, L974; Sachs, 1967, 1974). However,
there is also evidence that the degree of featural similarity
between distractors and acquisition material in a recognition
memory paradigm affects the degree of recognition accuracy (Baggett'
t975; Goldstein & Chance, 1970; Hunt & Elliott, 1980; Weaver &
Stanny, 1978). :
It is also evident that the variables of features and meaning
interact in determining performance. Biederman demonstrated that
object identification and scene recognitionwere rpre accurate when
scenes were presented in a meaningful' organised way' He also
demonstrated that in labelling tasks of briefly presented scenes'
identification of discrete obiects in the scene influenced percept-
ual decisions. Extensions of Biedennan's work by Palmer and others
confirmed that both meaningful context and the specific featural
elements of objects in scenes are equally relevant to perceptual
processing. Interpretations of data proved to be inadequate with-
out incorporating an inGraction of context and specific features
in the account. Mandter's studies of memory for pictorial scenes
shoved that both the discrete obiects in a scene and their spatial
relationships. were relevant to recognition perfonnance.
The contention of this thesis is that rpmory is determined by
an interaction of the meaning and features of stimulus material,
but in order to examine the nature of this interaction the tvro ma'in
variables must be distingurishable. Such distinction must be
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explicit to the experirenter, if not to the subiect. lllhen the dis-
tinction is not explicit, interpretation of the data may be mislead-
ing. This has been the case particularly with abstraction paradigms
which rely on recognition nemory performance to demonstrate the
integration of relationships between discrete elements in stimu1us
materi al .
When distractors vary both memory and features relative to the
acqu'isition material, apparent apprehension of the total meaning of
the acquisition set can also be explained in terms of the featural
structure of the stimulus mdterial. Bransford and Franks' classic
linguistic abstraction studies have been criticised precisely on
these grounds and the present thesis has criticised Jenkins' pictor-
ial abstraction studies on the same grounds.
It was argued that r'n the fusion experiments reported by
Jenkins, et al. (1978), distractors which were consistent with the
story dep'icted by 0riginal slides a'lso had more features in cormon
with Originals than d'id the inconsistent distractors. The variables
of senantic consistency and featural similarity were therefore
confounded.
The methodo'logical difficulty of demonstrating temporal inte-
gration through recognition memory performance is considerable.
At some stage during the procedure there must be an effective
separation of the meaning and features of materiais. Ideaily,'
jn a recognition paradigm where inferences are made on the basis of
responses to types of distractors this should be achieved by vary-
ing the test material directly a'long the dimension of meaning whilst
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holding featural properties constant,or vice versa- Qther proced-
ures for separating the crucial variab'les indirectly are possible
through manipulation of lhe aeqwLsition materLal" the aequLsition
eondLtio1s or the te*t eon&ttions. Because of the inherent diffi-
culties in achieving a direct separation of meaning and features
with complex pictorial material 
' 
the present research used each of
the indirect procedures before finally attempting a direct manipu-
lation of the test material.
The first experiment replicated Jenkins' findings of differen-
tial discrimination of Belongings and Transformations. It also
tested the fusion interpretation of these results by manipulating
the aeqari;erition. rffiBtnLa't'. in an attempt to keep featural properties
constant whilst varying the overall semant'ic structure of the
stimulus material. Perforrnance following Crdered Presentation of
acquisition material was compared with two Disordered hesentation
conditions - disordering of six separate s'lide sequences (the
Disordered-lllith'in condition) and disordering of a'll six sequences
together (the Disordercd-Within-and-Between conditr'on). Despite
evidence in the second experiment that the manipulation produced
the intended effect of disrupting semantic structure, d'0:B was
significantly lower than d'0:T in the Disordered Presentation condi-
tions, and the d'O:B rneasure relative to d'0:T did not differ across
presentati on condi t'ions.
The second experiment tested fusion by manipulating the
acqwLsi&i,m. task eon&itions so that the semantic and featural
properties of the material might be separated during acquisftion
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processing. Within an incidental learning paradigm, some subiects
were given a semantic task designed to facilitate fusion whereas
others were given a non-semantic task designed to inhibit fusion.
Although the semantic task group gave a more accurate performance
overa]l, d'0:B was signif icantly lower than d'0:T in both experi-
mental conditionsn and the degree of difference between the two d'
measures was not affected by the type Of acquisition task.
A third experiment tested fusion by manipulating the test
condLtions so that the contribution of the semantic and featural
properties of the material to memory might be separated by perfor-
mance 'impairment induced by delayed testing. Although memory was
significantly impaired after a retention interval of one week' both
d'O:B and d'0:T were reduced - a result inconsistent with a fusion
account.
The results of the first three experinents, therefore, did
not support a fusion account of the low d'0;B compared to d'0:T
measure. In both experinental procedures where a fusion interpre-
tation would have been supported by an attenuation of the response
pattern, this did not occur - manipulation of the acquisition.
rndterial by varying presentation order did not affect the response
and nor did manipulation of the acquisition conditions. where vary-
ing opienting tasks did not produce the expected difference in
response patterns. The manipulation of test conditions in the
third experirnent did not produce the more pronounced pattern at
impairment which wou'ld have been consistent with. a fusion interpre-
tation. Apart from examining the specific question of fusion, the
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first three experiments relate to more general questions concerning
narmry for pictorial materia'l , by their manipulation of the
variables of organisation, incidental learning taskso and retention
interval.
The effects of the incidental learning task and retention
interval variations wene consistent with related literatune. The
superiority of memory following semantic processing compared to
non-semantic process'ing during acquisition was demonstrated con-
vincingly with temporally ordered picture stories where the semantic
task was re'levant to the logical structure of the story and the non-
semantic task was related to a gross featural characteristic of
indiv'idual slides. These results were consistent with the
majority of levels-of-processing studies (Bower & Karlin' 1974;
Craik & Lockhart, L972; Craik & Tulving, 1975i Mistler-Lachman,
lg74). A rpre detailed analysis of the results of the second
experiment also supported studies which have shown that the degree
to which material can be processed in depth affccts performance.
A retention interva'l of one day did not impair recognition
performance compared to inmediate testingo whereas a one week
delay significantly reduced accuracy. These findings were cgnsis'
tent with other studies which have used pictorial material of a
homogeneous nature. Baggett (-1975) found that memory for the
featurai details of simple cartoon stories was not impaired by a
3-day retention interval. l'bndler and Parker C1976) reported impair-
ment of accuracy in rnemory for descriptive information about
pictorial scenes when testing was delayed for a week.
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The variable which has been not only the 'least wel"l explored
with complex picture sequences but also the most central. to the test
of fusion in the present studies is organisatl:on. A generally
accepted principle has been that organisation of to-be-remembered
material increases the accuracy and duration of memory (Kintsch'
1977; Tulving, L972). Classic experiments demonstrated the power
of this principle with category organisation (Bousefield, Cohen &
l.lhitmarsh, 1958) and associative organisation (Jenkins & Russell 
'
1952). In the absence of experimenter imposed organisation,
subjects themselves tend to organise stimulus material in order to
enhance merpry (Mandler, L972\. Organisation mantipulations are
primarily effective with recall procedures tKintsch, 1970),
although I'hndler t1972) has argued that recognition performance
can be improved if sufficiently strong manipu'lations of organisa-
tion ane used.
The effect of organ'isation on memory for pictorial material is
'less well documented. It appears, in general, that spatial organis-
ation of pictorial rnaterial is an effective variable, but its
effects depend on the particular task given to the subiect and the
specific materia'l used. Using photographic material of complex
every-day scenes, Biederman showed that accuracy is impaired and
latency increased in obiect identification tasks and labelling
tasksrgiven briefly presented spatially disorganised as olposed to
organ'ised scenes. Mandler's studies used simp'ler hand-drawn scenes
which were presented for several seconds, and assessment of perfor-
mance was in the context of recognition memory tests. In general
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she found that differences in recognition accuracy given spatially-
disorganised compared to organised scenes depended on the type of
information elic'ited by the recognition task. l''lemory for the
identity or figurative appearance of objects in a scene was
unaffected by disorganised presentation. Disorganisation impaired
menpry for the spatial relationships between obiects but enhanced
memory for the position or presence of any single obiect.
The effects of temporal disorganisation of series of related
pictures seem to be elusive. Although Jenkins et al. (tSZel
reported better discrimination of Belongings given a disordered
compared to ordered version of one of his photographic sequences
of every-day events, other studies have not found temporal organis-
ation to be an effective variable (Al'len, Siegel & Rosinski, L978;
Kraft & Jenkins, L977; Pittenger & Jenkins, 1979).
Nor did the first experiment in the present research obtain
any effect of organisation. Data fron the second experiment
suggested that this was because subiects were not basing their
recognition responses primarily on the temporal structure of the
material. The disorderr'ng procedure used in the first two experi-
rpnts was designed to vary the degree of disruption of semantic
structure,and acquisition data from the second experiment supported
this assumption when subiects'judgements of the logical order of
slides proved to be systematically related to the intended degrees
of disruption. Moreover, when subiects were explicity directed
to attend to the temporal structure of the acquisit'ion materia'l
during processing they gave less accurate recognition performances
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in the most Hsordered Presentation condition than in the Ondered
condition, whereas subiects who were directed to attend to the
surface structure of the acquisition material were not affected by
order of presentation.
The absence of an effect of temporal disordering has tended to
be explained by arguments that subiects spontaneously reconstruct
the disorder.ed sequences. Although Baker (1978) did not find
subjective re-organ'isation of temporal relationships in simple
verbal stories, there has been strong evidence that subiects re-
order disordered stories into their correct schematic order (Bovuer,
Black & Turner, 1979; Kintsch, Mandel & Kozminsky, L977; Mandler,
1978; Stein & G'lenn, 1978; Stein & Nezworski ' 1978). The
reconstruction explanation of absence of temporal organisation
effects was crucial to the present research, since if subiects
reconstruct disordered storie.s, disordering r's not a critical test
of fusion. The fourth and fifth experiments therefore examined the
variable of temporal organisation more directly.
The fourth experiment specifically attempted to establish that
subjects who saw a disordered presentation of acqui$ition material
werer ,r:'t able to reconstruct the underlying event. New material
was designed to minimise the possibility of reconstruction. This
long action-sequence was shown to subiects either in its correct
chronological order or in a randon order. They were asked to
provide written accounts of the slide sets and attempt to describe
the underlying event. Independent judges later decided that the
stories produced by the Disordered Presentation group were not
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close to the actual event and were significantly less so than the
accounts produced by the Qrdered Fresentation group. This experi-
ment principally demonstrated that the story in this particular
p'ictorial sequence could not be reconstructed from a disordered
presentation. It also showed that disordering did not impair over-
all recognition performance, and more particularly that signifi-
cantly low d'0:B values compared to d'0:T values were no different
for the ordered and disordered groups. Moreover reaction time
measures also showed no e-Ffect of order.
A fifth experiment confirmed the recognition memory results
of the previous experiment without the inclusion of the recall-
writing task. There was no evidence of an effect of temporal
organisationn and no support for the fusion account of recognition
menory of pictorial sequences.
The results of the experiments which attempted to separate
meaning from features by indirect methods in order to examine the
fusion hypothesis, did not support a fusion account and were con-
sistent with a featural account of this type of recognition perfor-
mance. The final experiment therefore attempted to vary the test
mater-iaL directly along the dr'mension of featural similarity to
acquisition material, whils,t holding the meaning of the individual
test slides consistent with the overall event shown during acquisi-
tion. Although this experiment was unsuccessftil, it was suggested
that with material designed expficitly for the purpose, it might be
possible to examine variations in featural similarity of distractors
via their chrono'log'ical distance from an ordered acquisition set,
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whilst holding overall meaning constant.
In surmary, the present research did not find any evidence to
suggest that recognition memory for pictoria'l sequences is deter-
mined by a representation of the tota'l event depicted by the
sequence. The main results indicated that recognition performance
is determined by the degree of featural similarity between distrac-
tors and original slides, and this effect can be demonstrated in
procedures which vary acquisition material, acquisition task' and
retention interval. A conclusive demonstration of the effect of
featural similarity requires systematic variation of features with-
out a confounding of the variable of meaning. The present research
attempted this demonstration and suggested that with complex photo-
graph slide sequences of every-day eventsn further research could
be directed towards examining the affects of featural simi'larity
by developing stimulus material which varied magnitude of featural
change in relation to chronological distance.
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APPENDIX A: SU.{'S$RY TABLES Of. ANOVAS
This appendix presents srmnary tables of all ANQVAS referred
to in the experirnents. They are listgd ln the order in which
they appeared and are referenced by Experiment, (and page number).
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Sunmary of ANOVA relating to data in Experiment I (p.77)
Source ssdfMsF
Presentation Type .29 2 .15 -47
S/Presentation Type 6.67 2l .32
Distractor Type 3.87 t 3.87 35.18
Presentation Type xbi;ilil;"irpi' '31 2 ' 16 1'4s
Di.stractor Type_x 2..3g ZI . 11S/Presentation Type
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Sunmary of ANOVA relating to data in Experirpnt I (0.81)
Source ss df l4s F
Presentation Type .10 1 .10 .38
S/Presentation Type 5.39 2l .26
Distractor Type 2.t7 I 2.17 31
Presentation Type x
Distractor Type '24 L '24 3'43
Distractor Type_x 1-56 ZL .07S/Presentation TyPe
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Suruna of ANOVA relating to E riment II
Source MSdf
Presentation TyPe
Task Type
Presentation TYPe x
Task Type
S/Presentation TyPe
Task Type
Distractor TyPe
Presentation TyPe x
Distractor TyPe
Task Type x
Distractor TyPe
Presentation TyPe x
Task Type x
Distractor TyPe
Distractor TyPe x
S/Presentation TyPe x
Task Type
1.64
3.63
.78
13.34
9.60
.07
3.01
2
1
.82
3.63
.39
2.56
11 .34
r.22
42 .32
9.60 137 .L4
.04
. 11 L.57
L.7T
.57
.11
.23 .12
.0742
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S.unmary of ANOVA relatins tq Experiqgnt II (p.88)
Source ssdfMsF
Presentation Type 9300 2 4650 123.93
S/Presentation TyPe 788 21 37.62
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Presentation TYPe
S/Presentation TYPe
Distractor TyPe
Presentation TYPe x
Distractor TyF
S/Pnesentatlm TYPe x
Distractor Type
2.34
6.82
3.85
.04
.92
2
2L
1
t.t7
.33
3,85
.02
3.55
96.25
.05
.042t
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Snnnnry of ff'IQVA Flatino to data in ExqerirBnt II (p.91)
Source ss df l!6 F
Fresentation Type .08 2 .04 '13
S/Presentation Type 6.51 ?l .31
Distractor Typa 5,86 1 5.86 58"60
Presentation Type x 
,ZS Z .13 l.SDistractor Type
S/Presentation Type x Z.Og ZI .10Distractor Type
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to data in
Retention lnterval
S/Retention Interval
Distractor Type
Retention Interval x
Distractor Type
S/Retention Interval x
Distractor Type
2.6t
L7.77
9.76
.01
22,I3
2
45
1
1.31
.39
9.76
0
.49
3.36
19.9?
0
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SrmarJ of At{0}A rslStiqs-to data in Ex8eriqnnt I.U (p.129)
Source SS df !15 F
PresentationTyPe 0 1 0 0
S/Presentation TYPe 5'88 ?2 .31
Dtstractor Type 32.44 I 3e.44 X41.04
H:ffi!|||l%H*" .03 I .03 .13
S/Preseltatlon TYPe x S.10 ZZ .A3Distractor TyPe
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Sunmary of A[0VA relatine to data in Experiment IV (P.120J
Source ss df lls F
Presentation Type 225000 1 226000 .82
S/Presentation Type 5741000 2L 273381
Distractor Type 43000 1 43000 .53
Presentation TyPe x 1000 1 1000 .01Distractor Type
S/Presentation Type x 1714000 Zl 81619Distractor Type
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Sunmar.v of Alrl0VA relStirlq to dala in ExPgrimqnt lV Jp.12A
Source SSdfMSF
Presentation Type 60000 1 60000 .2L
S/Presentation Type 6086000 2t 289810
Distractor Type 2708000 1 2708000 42.89
Presentation Type x 35000 I 35000 ,SsDistractor TyPe
S/Presentation Type x 1326000 ZL 63143Distractor Type
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Sunmary of AN0VA relating to data in Experimen-t Y (p.12.9)
Source SSdfMSF
Presentation TyPe .49 1 .49 .60
S/Presentation TyPe 18.12 22 .82
Distractor Type 33.17 1' 33'.17 85'05
Bi:il::i:l'lrJ{0" .11 1 .11 .28
S/Presentation TYPe x g.54 ZZ .39Distractor TyPe
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Surflnary of ANOVA relatinq to data in Experirnnt V (p'129\
Source
Experinpnt
Presentation TYPe
Experiment x
Presentat'ion TYPe
S/Experiment x
Presentation TYPe
Distractor Type
Experiment x
Distractor TyPe
Presentation TYPe
Distractor TyPe
Experiment x
Presentation TyPe
Distractor TyPe
Distractor TyPe x
S/Experiment x
Presentation TyPe
4.2t
.28
.21
65.61
0
1
1
4.?L
.28
,21
7.39
.49
.37
25 44 .57
65.61 211.65
0
00
.14
13.64 44
.45.14
.31
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l,urmany of AI{0VA rclating to datA in Experi{€nt V-.,1F.193I
ssdfMsF
Presentation Type 310000 I 310000 -5i2
SlPresentation Type 10753000 18 597389
Oistractor Type 20000 1 20000 .2!
Presentation Type x 2g4000 1 254000 Z,l!Distractor Type
S/Presentation Type x 16g9000 1g 93g33Distractor Type
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Summary of ANOVA relating to data ln Experinent V (p.133)
Source df
Experiment
Prcsentati on TyPe
Experiment x
Presentation Type
S/Experiment x
Presentation Type
Distractor Type
Experiment x
Distractor Type
Presentation Type
Distractdr Type
Experiment x
Presentation Type
Distractor Type
Distractor Type x
S/Experiment x
Presentation Type
114000
3403000 39 87256
118000
531000
6000
16493000
62000
3000
139000
118000
531000
6000
.28
t.26
.01
422897
62000
3000
139000 1.59
114000 1.31
L
1
39
.71
.03
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Source
Presentation TyPe
S/Presentation TYPe
Di stracton TlPe
Presentation TyPe x
D,istractor Type
S/Presentation Type x
Distractor Type
333000
7552000
2719000
5000
1809000
1
22
333000 .97
343273
2719000 33-07
82227
.06
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Sunmar.v.of ANOVA relating to data in Experiment V (p.134)
Source df
Experiment
Presentation TyPe
Experiment x
Presentati on TyPe
S/Experiment x
Presentation TyPe
Distractor TyPe
Experiment x
Eistractor Type
Presentat'ion TyPe
Distractor TyPe
Experiment x
Presentation TyPe
Distractor TyPe
Distractor TyPe x
S/Experiment x
Presentation TyPe
334000
339000
56000
13637000
5428000
0
7000
334000 1.05
339000 1.07
317140
5428000 74.45
7000 .10
21000 .29
.18
43
21000
3135000 43 7?907
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Srmrarw of AllOVA relating tq data in ExperiTrent V (p.,134J
Source
Experiment
Presentation TYPe
Experircnt x
Presentation TyPe
SlExperimnt x
Pvesentatioh TyPe
47000
'39000
415000
.22
.18
47000
39000
1
1
415000
2t76t5 1.91
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Slsmqry of AN0VA felatinq to data in E{perircnt V (p.134)
Source
Experiment
Presentation TyPe
Experitmnt x
Pvesentation TYPe
S/Experiment x
Presentation TyPe
155000
261000
1
1
166000
261000
1. 15
1.81
.2435000
6356000 144tt55
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Surmarv of AN0VA relating to data in Ef<pertment V (p:g4)
Source l'6dfss
PYesentati on TyPe
S/Presentation TyPe
Transformation Type
Presentation Type x
Transformation TyPe
S/Presentati on Type x
Transformation TyPe
1L
11980
4743
t2L0
t7714 66
1
2?
3
11
545
1581
403
268
.02
5.90
1.50
-t77 -
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